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In post-conflict settings, a network of actors with differing agendas converge to engender a process of 
reestablishing a viable state. After the Bosnian War, the imposition of the Dayton Peace Accords fostered 
a post-conflict procedure to ensure the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The history of 
ethnic cleansing during the conflict created a unique set of spatial conditions that required a unique process 
for reconciliation. This thesis investigates the process of property restitution as a post-conflict 
reconciliation tool. Through understanding the complexities of the conditions produced by conflict and 
the landscape of post-conflict reconciliation, refugee return through property restitution can be better 
understood. The unique process and outcome of ethnic cleansing, the insistent international presence in 
post-conflict Bosnia, and the normative prescriptions for mass displacement amalgamate into a context 
that inspires the imposition of a property restitution regime. Through quantitative analyses using data 
concerning refugee return, property repossession claims, and sociodemographic change, I investigate the 
efficacy of the return-restitution nexus by municipalities in Bosnia. Regression analyses, population 
proportionality scores, and dissimilarity indices are the tools used to expose the impact of property 
restitution on refugee return, and the subsequent durability of these solutions for goals of reintegration. 
Through archival research and secondary sources, I aim to complement the results of the data analyses 
based on the lived-experiences of Bosnians in their post-conflict setting. The study concludes by applying 
the case of property restitution in Bosnia to the literature of post-conflict reconciliation, which is followed 
by recommendations on how to expand upon refugee return as a durable solution to displacement. 
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The concern for sustainable post-conflict reconstruction transcends the localities affected by War and 
implicates the global community. Migration flows, the globalized economy, multilateral institutions, 
hyper-connectivity, and international norms regarding human rights have coalesced to ensure that 
when the common global order is unstable, the international community will respond. While the liberal 
world order may maintain the balance, the effects are the most acute at the local level. This outcome 
is precisely the case for the international involvement of the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). 
Due to the War, the impacts of mass displacement, transitioning political and economic systems, and 
neoliberal interventionist ideals spurred the process of stabilization. 
 
The Bosnian War (1992-1995), defined by ethnic cleansing, mass displacement, and abundant 
violence, led to a profound spatial, demographic, and political restructuring in the BiH, and a case 
study of the transitioning role of the international community. While War inherently impacts the 
political order of a state, territorial gains through population expulsion created a unique geographic 
order that differed from the pre-war spatial makeup. The efforts to reconcile the outcomes of the 
Bosnian War involve a complex network of reconstruction1 paradigms and implementing mechanisms 
that aim to resolve issues of displacement, reintegration, and reconciliation, and more broadly, social, 
political, and economic development. 
 
The reconciliation efforts throughout Bosnia continue—still in year twenty-five—where high 
unemployment rates, political fragmentation, and ethnic tension remain nearly as quotidian as the 
immediate years after the War. The purpose of this research is to understand the theoretical and 
practical application of property restitution and refugee return as post-conflict paradigms in BiH. 
Analyzing their impacts on desired outcomes of reconciliation in the Bosnian context will push the 
discourse on normative post-conflict frameworks in the international arena. The research output 
critically evaluates the role of property restitution as a mechanism to inspire refugee return and the 
more laudable goal of creating the environment for the meaningful reintegration of displaced persons. 
The precarious context of post-conflict settings, given the raw wounds of conflict or the opportunism 
involved in reconstruction, requires critical attention to the conception of post-conflict reconciliation 
measures and their implementation processes, and whether they adequately support sustainable peace.  
 
This thesis includes a background description of the Bosnian War and the post-conflict reconstruction 
process. After identifying critical aspects of the context, a literature review will expand on the 
theoretical framework linking the Bosnian experience to broader applications of reconstruction. The 
methodology and findings are presented in one combined section analyzing the impacts of the 
reconstruction process by opština through quantitative and qualitative analyses.2 Finally, concluding 
remarks will identify themes and considerations related to the development of refugee return, property 
repossession, and reconciliation, aiming to provide insights for future policies and strategies to achieve 
sustainable peace, post-conflict reconciliation, and durable community-economic development. 
 
1 There is a debate on the most appropriate terminology for describing post-conflcit settings, however, my research does not 
touch upon this discourse, and uses reconstruction, recovery, stabilization, development, and reconciliation interchangibly to 
describe the post-conflict process in Bosnia. Yet, all these terms essentially aim to reactivate economic, social, political 
development, and create a sustainable peace. 
2 Opština is a geographic political unit that is representative of the most granular scale of governance in BiH. It can be compared 
to a municipal, district, or county boundary. 





Conflict permeates the globe, and displacement is a distinct outcome that impacts the individual, the 
community, the region, and the world. As the international community consistently pursues conflict 
resolution, the challenges of resolving displacement stimulate the discourse. This thesis aims to analyze 
and discuss the impacts of the processes—from conceptualization to implementation—of refugee 
return and property restitution on post-conflict reconciliation. The foundational research question for 
this study: How has the imposition of a property restitution regime for refugees impacted the 
processes of reconstruction in Bosnia? Given the political nature of implementing the peace 
agreement that ended the Bosnian War, three sub-questions follow the main research question: Was 
the implementation of the property restitution regime successful as a mechanism for refugee return in 
post-conflict Bosnia? Has the property restitution regime supported the vision of reintegration 
through refugee return? 
 
Given the spatial nature associated with the geopolitics of war, and subsequently, the mechanisms to 
reverse these outcomes, an understanding of the post-conflict demographic character of Bosnia is 
critical to this research. Migratory movement undergirds the processes of displacement and refugee 
return, and therefore an understanding of these shifting landscapes is a robust metric to analyze the 
efficacy of return as resolution. Identifying localities that contain demographic deviations from the 
standard post-conflict ethnic breakdown can enlighten further analysis into why the differences exist. 
More specifically, the relationships between property restitution, refugee return, and local 
demographic identities may elicit a nuanced understanding of the efficacy in implementation and 
overall conceptualization as paradigms of post-conflict reconstruction. However, a prudent 
explanation of the potential risks, assumptions, and limitations these analyses must qualify the 
proposed analyses.  
Background 
Bosnia and Herzegovina3 is a southeastern European country formally integrated within the  Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Bosnia was established in 1995 following the Dayton Peace 
Agreement.4 The country is made up of three ethnic groups, differing in demographics from most the 
ethnically homogenized former-Yugoslavian republics. Based on the 1991 census, Bosniaks (50.11 
percent), Bosnian Serbs (30.78 percent), Bosnian Croats (15.43 percent), and other ethnicities, 
including Jews and Romas (2.73 percent), make up BiH (Ministry of Statistics, 1991). The multiethnic 
nature of Bosnia was a conflict driver of the violent conflict that would ensue during the early nineties. 
That said, the full scope of conflict drivers is essential to contextualize the landscape in which post-
conflict reconstruction took place. While the campaign of ethnic cleansing is a critical element of the 
War and post-conflict environment, other factors that propelled the War and assisted in the stagnation 
of peace shall be investigated. 
 
 
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina refer to the state established following the resolution of the Bosnian War. In this paper, the state of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, established in 1995, will be referenced as either BiH or Bosnia.  
4 The Dayton Peace Agreement, or the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia, is the peace accords negotiated in 
Dayton, Ohio at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Facilitated by Richard Holbrooke, under the direction of Bill Clinton, the 
peace accords established a political process to end the violence in Bosnia. Parties to the agreement included Yugoslavia, Bosnia, 
and Croatia, with witnesses representing the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and the European 
Union. In this paper, the Dayton Peace Accords will be referenced as either Dayton or the DPA. 
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Yugoslavia maintained an inter-ethnic character after World War II solely based on the unifying 
character of one man, Josip Broz Tito. Tito supported coexistence among the diverse ethnicities that 
made up Yugoslavia through a socialist federation (Dawa Norbu, 1999). In Bosnia, national 
intolerance was suppressed by Tito's communist regime; mixed marriages in Bosnia were normalized, 
that, as of 1981, over half the population of BiH had a close relative of a different nationality (Toal, 
Dhalman, 2011). Although modernization schemes enabled economic development, leading to a 
subsequent high rate of urbanization, the Bosnian republic was less developed than other Yugoslav 
republics, resulting in an out-migration of Serbs to Serbia, and Croats to Croatia (Burg, Shoup, 2001). 
The modernization scheme under Tito resulted in varying levels of development between the 
republics, and uneven development between urban and rural areas.  
 
The economic disparities manifested as political ones. The dissolution of Yugoslavia engendered a 
fragmentation of inter-ethnic solidarity through the imposition of geographical control by a 
nationalistic entity. Interestingly, the spatial control for land, based on ethnic character and historical 
significance, manifests through political, military, and personal mechanisms. The Bosnian Republic 
was characterized as cadre-driven by political elites, where maintaining power outweighed national 
interests. Given the six republics that seemingly separated on ethnic lines, ethnic equality would soon 
lose to ethnic chauvinism. The 1990 elections in Yugoslavia saw a resounding victory by nationalist 
parties over the traditionalist communists (Burg, Shoup, 2001). Although the federal system aspired 
for ethnic integration, Serbian monopolization of the political power structure reinforced ethnic 
nationalism through the limited provision of central state services (Dawa Norbu, 1999). The ethnically 
inclined federalism of Yugoslavia is a significant conflict driver in fostering separation among the six 
republics. In the Bosnian republic's political system, communists were the ruling party and made of a 
tri-ethnic constituency (Maksić, 2015). However, Serbian political dominance in Yugoslavia, with 
Slobodan Milošević as the political leader, supported Bosnian Serb party members to defect and 
establish the nationalistic Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). This central political pressure by Milošević, 
along with the fragmentation of the Bosnian communist party, upended the maintenance of the 
multiethnic, independent republic within Yugoslavia. Given its multiethnic nature and trends of 
intercultural marriages, the transition towards nationalism may seem like a vagary within the cultural 
and political landscape of Bosnia. Yet, as termed by Andrej Grubačić, the context of Yugoslavia, 
"Balkanization from above" and describes it as: 
 
"breaking Balkan inter-ethnic solidarity and regional sociocultural identity; a process of violently incorporating the region into the system 
of nation-states and capitalist world-economy; and the contemporary imposition of neoliberal colonialism." 
 
The conceptualization of a top-down imposition of Balkanization fits the trajectory of the Bosnian 
War. Political elites in Belgrade were crafting a narrative that upended ethnic heterogeneity in Bosnia, 
spurring political and social upheaval. This Serbian influence did not preclude Bosniaks or Croats 
from adopting political ethnonationalism. The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) represented the 
nationalists of Bosnian Muslims, and the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) represented the 
nationalistic preferences of Bosnian Croats (Donia, Robert, 2006). An enduring characteristic of the 
nationalist parties was the political patronage networks, where nepotism supplanted traditional 
meritocracy, as well as burgeoning secessionist objectives (Donia, Robert, 2006). These practices 
would carry throughout the War and flourish as an impediment to just reconstruction initiatives, which 
will be explained later in the paper. 
 
The beginning of political instability perpetuated by nationalistic objectives in Bosnia is seen in the 
efforts of the SDS to obtain single-party control at the municipal level in Sarajevo. Seeking to fragment 




the city of Sarajevo, the SDS created a tactic of "regionalization," which identified municipalities within 
the City of Sarajevo that had Serb majorities, proposed their secession, and halted the inclusion of tax 
revenues to the city (Donia, Robert, 2006). The perception of unfair economic marginalization of the 
more rural municipalities within Sarajevo was the rationale for the practice of withholding tax 
revenues. Yet, deceptively, regionalization was the initial step in crafting a separate, politically 
independent Serb state in Bosnia. Ironically, this subversive practice was rewarded after the War—the 
critical deficiencies of the peace processes are foundational to this thesis and will be further analyzed. 
 
At the behest of delegates representing the HDZ and the SDA, a "declaration of sovereignty" was 
passed in the Assembly of Bosnia (Donia, Robert, 2006). In response, the SDS activated a plan to 
establish rival judicial and legislative units within the municipalities to seize power under Bosnian Serb 
national institutions. The crisis staff and Bosnian Serb municipal assemblies aimed to subvert the 
current political power and consolidate under Serb control. Ethnic division in Bosnia first manifested 
as the SDS continued to establish "parallel institutions" within the municipalities of the republic, 
fomenting political separation by the Serbs. The Serb breakaway campaign began as a political strategy 
but soon would transition into a military engagement (Donia, Robert, 2006). 
 
Each of the nationalist parties began taking to arms and establishing paramilitary formations. The 
development of paramilitaries reflects the underlying concern each group had against the other 
regarding territorial control of Bosnia. Given Milošević's political monopolization in Belgrade, and the 
Serb-dominated Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), the SDS was backed by a federal army that controlled 
heavy artillery, planes, helicopters, armored vehicles, and other modern military equipment (Donia, 
Robert, 2006). Before the escalation into conflict, the international community issued its first 
imposition on the matter of Bosnian secession. The European community suggested a referendum to 
understand the polity's position on the political affairs of the Bosnian republic. During the vote, the 
SDS pressured Bosnian Serbs from participating, and with the majority of Bosniaks and Bosnian 
Croats voting, the referendum passed and the European Community recognized Bosnian 
independence (Gow, 1997). Upon the official recognition of Bosnian independence on March 2nd, 
violence erupted. In the face of the looming War, a peace movement aimed to halt the aggression 
called the "Valter movement" (Donia, Robert, 2006). On April 6th, the peaceful protests were met with 
sniper fire, and JNA artillery began to assault the city with heavy artillery.  
 
Figure 1. Result of Bosnian Independce Referendum of 1992 
 
 
A critical element of the Bosnian War was the campaign of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing military 
tactics were not solely owned by one ethnic group in Bosnia (Friedman, 2004). Members of each 
ethnicity were forcibly removed from their homes based on their identity. However, the power 
discrepancy in military force enabled Serb forces to conduct ethnic cleansing on a grander scale—the 
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SDS conducted the majority of ethnic cleansing campaigns while Bosniaks were the overwhelming 
majority (Bartrop, 1995). In Bosnia, the JNA and the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) 
delegated the power to the paramilitary groups to conduct executions, internment, and expulsion of 
non-Serbs from "Serb land" (Toal, Dahlman, 2011). Accounts of murder, rape, and looting by Serb 
paramilitaries on civilians in Karakaj expose the tactics used to consolidate geographic territory 
(Williams, 2005). The pursuit of ethnoterritorialism, as described by Toal and Dahlman, can be 
summed up by a local Zvornik5 Serb: "let the Muslims go to their own areas of Bosnia, they can live 
peacefully there. But we are not going to live with them here," Yet, other local actions contested the 
ethnocentric perspective described above, including sheltering of Muslims and pleas of humanity 
(Burns, 1992). Differing experiences of ethnic cleansing display the complexity of how ethnoterritorial 
control manifests in Bosnian localities—alluding to an imposed nationalistic agenda from political 
elites. 
 
Figure 2. War Related Deaths between 1991-1995 
 
 
Often, expulsion was a product of legal mechanisms and not brutality. Legal documents that formally 
declared "willingness" to leave, signed by Muslims, crafted a false jurisprudence of removal (Toal, 
Dahlman, 2011). Other efforts to solidify ethnic homogeneity in parts of Bosnia included targeting 
cultural sites of the "other." Place-destroying and place-remaking created a "facts-on-the-ground" 
circumstance that reified the ethnoterritorial campaign (Toal, Dahlam, 2011). The tactics and 
outcomes of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia are analyzed in detail within the literature review; however, it 
is essential to note some of the specific accounts to frame the war in Bosnia.  
 
 
5 Zvornik is a town in northeastern Bosnia bordering Serbia. Prior to the war, the town had a 60 percent Bosniak majority. Most 
of eastern Bosnia was Muslim, nearly 78 percent of the population, with only 10 percent being Serb, which displays the 
immensity of ethnic cleansing on “Serb land.” 




Figure 3. Number of Refugees or IDPs between 1992-1995 
 
 
The military tactic of "urbicide" is definitive of the Bosnian's War foundational relationship to space. 
The most striking evidence of the tactics or urbicide was the siege of Sarajevo. To consolidate the 
majority of Sarajevo under Serb control, the SDS effectively took the city hostage by a siege campaign 
that prioritized an incremental assault on the city to keep civilians' "hostage" as leverage in negotiations 
(Donia, 2006). While the indiscriminate shelling and sniper fire traumatized civilians, the SDS also 
targeted essential services and aid to further their position in negotiations with the international 
community. As the political and cultural center of Bosnia, Sarajevo's control was also a goal of 
ethnoterritorial consolidation by the SDS. Shelling and sniper fire targeted Muslim neighborhoods to 
further the ethnic cleansing of the population and cultural sites (Williams, 2005). Figure 4 and Figure 
5 show the enormity of the destruction of religious sites relevant to specific ethnicities. In the literature 
review, urbicide will be analyzed as a form of ethnic cleansing, as a form of expulsion of memory and 
cultural heritage.  
 




The extent of human rights violations through ethnic cleansing in Bosnia required meaningful 
international involvement, yet, the international norm of interventionism stagnated during the Bosnian 
War. In 1992, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 743 created the United Nations 
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Protection Force (UNPROFOR, 1992). In Bosnia, UNPROFOR began as a peacekeeping mission 
that escorted humanitarian aid and monitored safe areas and weapons exclusion zones (Akashi, 1995). 
Yet, concerted multilateral intervention in Bosnia to end the violence was absent but became involved 
in a peacekeeping capacity to assist UNPROFOR. Even within the European community, relevant 
states did not all share the same perspective on the War—some believed it was aggression by the 
Serbs, and others thought it to be a civil war—hindering a multilateral strategy to deal with the violence 
occurring.  The United States neglected swift action to support the values of human rights and was 
reluctant to take a leading role in the promotion of Western security (Friedman, 2004). Bush's 
administration ignored the problem, and Clinton's Administration took two years before engaging in 
the conflict (Daadler, 1998). The complex geopolitics of the post-Cold War, Western democratic 
relationships (NATO), interventionism, and general domestic politics gave the United States pause on 
intervention outside of humanitarian relief.  
 
The peace process in Bosnia began with the Vance-Owen Peace Plan sponsored by the United States 
and the European Union. The first iteration of a peace negotiation created a power-sharing 
arrangement in a sovereign Bosnia, a weak central government, and ten provincial, semi-autonomous 
governments (Bose, 2006). The plan was rejected by Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs, for differing 
reasons. Bosniaks thought the plan legitimized the campaigns of ethnic cleansing by rewarding 
autonomous territory to Croats and Serbs. The Bosnian Serb delegation lamented the loss of territory 
gained in War and inadequate ethnic homogeneity in many of the provinces (Kartsonaki, 2017). The 
failure of this peace plan led to the 1994 Washington Agreement, which allowed the Bosnian Army 
(ARBiH) to obtain arms. It effectively rebalanced the military dynamic against the Serbs (Friedman, 
2013). Bosnian Serbs were under pressure to engage in peace talks after increasing territorial losses 
and an alliance formed between Croatia and Bosnia in 1995 (Kartsonaki, 2017). Later, NATO 
airstrikes on SDS forces finally displayed the international community's desire to end the conflict, 
which resulted in the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs. A ceasefire ensued in 
October of 1995, and the representatives of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs began negotiations in Dayton, 
Ohio moderated by the United States.  
 
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was guided by the goal of establishing peace in Bosnia. The 
DPA, also known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace, successfully ended the War and 
stopped the human suffering. Eleven Annexes define the agreement and represent transitions in the 
operations of military and police, geographical boundaries, human rights, elections, the constitution, 
displacement, and the role of the state, international community, and civil society in promoting peace. 
The agreement recognized Bosnia's referendum on independence, establishing its historical borders 
as the geography of sovereign statehood (Chakov, 2017). Internally, Bosnia was divided by the Inter-
Entity Boundary Line that created the political borders of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(FBiH), Respublika Srpska (RS), and the District of Brcko categorized as entities and a particular 
district, respectively. FBiH and RS operate as a confederal union, and the politics dominate through 
"self-rule" as opposed to the federal government (Bose, 2005). Ethnicity dominated the conversations 
at Dayton, and in the efforts of parity, the DPA organized Bosnian political structures as a 
consociationalism model requiring an ethnic power-sharing arrangement at political levels to govern 
a multiethnic state (Chakov, 2017). Countering vital elements for peace, including norms that bolster 
human rights and partnering with the international community, the DPA reified ethnic division 
through a partition and bestowed power to a decentralized political elite—a divide that naturally will 
impede reconstruction. 
 




While the DPA effectively brought peace to Bosnia through cessation of violence, the context of 
identity-based conflict, which it was striving to find an enduring solution too, required a concerted 
effort. The campaign of ethnic cleansing within the Bosnian War had the damaging impacts of mass 
displacement, psychological trauma, and regional/local instability. The element of resolve enlisted by 
the DPA to accommodate these tragedies was the assurance that refugees and IDPs would be able to 
return home (DPA, 1995). Upon the end of the conflict, more than half the pre-war Bosnian 
population had been displaced—internally and globally (USCRI, 2001). Of the migrants expelled 
during the conflict, 1.2 million Bosnians became refugees, fleeing the state borders of Bosnia. Around 
1 million Bosnians became internally displaced, seeking refuge outside of their original municipality; 
in total, nearly half the Bosnian pre-war population were displaced during the conflict (Izet, et al, 
2006). Of those Bosnians who would become refugees, many remained regionally displaced, with 
Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro hosting nearly 40 percent of displaced Bosnians. Germany and 
Austria accounted for around 35 percent of displaced Bosnians, and the remaining 25 percent fled 
across the globe, yet mostly to other European countries (Izet, et al, 2006).  
 
Figure 6. Return of RDPs to Bosnia by Migrant Type 
 
Figure 6 displays the timeframe in which returnees repatriated to Bosnia. The chart shows that returns 
immediately after the cessation of hostilities were the highest but subsequently decreased. With the 
end of conflict serviced by the DPA, Bosnians began to return to their origins of displacement. Annex 
7 of the DPA established the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and 
Refugees (CRPC) to support the claims of property by displaced persons. For IDPs, return occurred 
either in rehabilitated vacant housing for temporary use, housing with relatives and friends, or local 
support for integration mechanisms (ICG, 1997). The return of refugees followed a specific 
progression; repatriated refugees would return to areas where their ethnicity was the majority, and if 
their origin made them the ethnic minority, specific plans would begin that return process (HLWM, 
1996). After 1999, the returns of displaced populations increased until 2002, which indicates that a 
specific event occurred in Bosnia to inspire more return. Compounding the inherent complexity of 
refugee return, municipal governments and local communities engaged in activities to obstruct 
minority returns. While the international community sought to create accessibility for refugees to 
return, through repairing housing, assessing viable communities, incentivizing municipal support, 
creating coalitions for return, and creating free bus services between municipalities of return, elements 
that precluded return were abound (ICS, 2006). General complications with return are attributed to 
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housing and infrastructure damage, poor employment opportunities, and general war-related 
psychological trauma. Yet, more pernicious modes of obstruction were manifested through 
community hostility, economic discrimination, unfair housing law, reintegration propaganda, and 
limited political rights for minorities (RRTF, 1999). To overcome the obstruction of return and the 
declining numbers of returnees, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) which oversees the 
civilian implementation of the peace accords as mandated by Annex 10, gained additional powers of 
enacting binding decisions and removing obstructionist elected officials (Peace Implementation 
Council, 1997). The policies that supported refugee return—as seen previously  in Figure 6—by 
overcoming obstructionist tactics will be further explained in the analysis section. 
 
The overall efforts of the DPA lie in the processes of economic reconstruction, democratization, and 
refugee return (Pejnovic, 2005). This thesis dives into Annex 7 of the DPA, which aims to support 
refugee return through a process of property restitution (DPA, 1995). Given the DPA's emphasis on 
international governance in the process of reconstruction, this paper also investigates how the scales 
of governance have affected the implementation of the return regime. The background aimed to give 
a succinct understanding of conflict drivers of war, the impact of conflict, and the programs for peace. 
Each of these fundamental segments of the Bosnian context frames the development of a theoretical 
framework. These aspects will be further analyzed in the following section. 
Literature Review 
To better understand how property restitution impacted post-conflict reconstruction, the issues 
exposed in the Background section must be further defined. The tragedies of ethnic cleansing in the 
Bosnian War not only led to mass migration but reconfigured local Bosnian communities, precluding 
a return to normality. Yet, the international community sought a return to normalcy for Bosnians 
through reestablishing the pre-war environment. With ethnic cleansing as a specific ailment to resolve 
and the international community as a foundational clinician, property restitution and refugee return 
are two prescriptions used to influence post-conflict reconciliation. With this progression established 
in the Bosnian War—ethnic cleansing spurs an international presence to end the conflict and inspire 
reconciliation through property restitution and refugee return—the literature review follows suit. 
 
The literature review exposes four foundational aspects that define the theoretical framework for 
property restitution's impact on refugee return. Each section looks at history to frame the current 
landscape of the issue. First, evolving processes of post-conflict reconstruction through transitions 
from internationalist interventions to grassroots peacebuilding. Second, an investigation into the 
indelible mark of ethnic cleansing on geography, society, and individual. Third, ethnic cleansing's 
outcome on displacement displays a diversity of responses that inform the processes in Bosnia. Finally, 
the conceptualization of property restitution as a post-conflict solution to the ills produced by the 
identity-based conflict. 
Post-Conflict Paradigms 
Post-conflict reconstruction is a highly contested field; in theory and context, the avenues to achieve 
a lasting peace are rife with tension. Initially, post-conflict reconstruction had the sole focus of "state-
building." The notion of state-building as a practice to produce peace was founded on the idea that 
security organizations, developmental organizations, corporations, and the global community need, at 
the core, efficient institutions to combat conflict, eradicate poverty, promote growth, and produce 




stability, respectively. A capable, sovereign state that delivers these services for their population is 
likely to create negative peace—the absence of violent conflict (Ghani, A., & Lockhart, C, 2008). More 
profoundly, the preeminence of the state came from the Western social sciences assertion that 
intrastate conflict comes from economic backwardness or non-Western traditional values (Skocpol, 
1985). Modernization was the prescription, and the governmental legislative organization was the 
purveyor, intending to 'bring the state back in' (Skocpol, 1985). There is no definitive timeline for the 
recreation of economic development, establishment of democratic institutions, and humanitarian 
assistance for citizens; the international order has historically imposed the state-building project for 
peace, so the long-term commitment by the international community is a criterion for successful 
implementation. 
 
Given the externalities of a dysfunctional state—political violence, violent extremists, and terrorists—
efforts of state-building are required to resolve conflict (Howard, 2014). Argued by Ghani and 
Lockhart (2008), state-building needs to incorporate a strategic framework for defining the functions 
of the state, designing the organizational structure to enact those functions, and aggregating actors to 
the goal of state-building. However, the framework does not take a traditionalist approach to state-
building. Still, it adopts a discussion surrounding the nature of the state based on the debate among 
pluralists and structural-functionalists. These two political philosophies create an understanding of 
what makes a nation of disparate groups function. Therefore, these philosophies act as a justification 
for creating a governmental body (nation-state) to guide the interaction of politics, economics, and 
social interaction (Skocpol, 1985). Yet, the inventory of state transformation projects provides a 
bountiful set of case studies to adapt transformative projects; overtime, programs in the post-conflict 
have progressed through innovations in conceiving the relationship between governance on one side, 
and the state, economy, and civil society on the other. In this conception, post-conflict countries, 
more specifically their authority, must create a "double compact," one between the international 
community, and one between the citizenry (Ghani, A., & Lockhart, C, 2008). However, power 
discrepancies exist within this "double compact," primarily when the nature of the conflict was based 
on nationalist predilections of the political elite, much like the case of Bosnia.   
 
The literature on post-conflict peacebuilding has recognized the potential downfalls related to state-
building, and specifically, "liberal" state-building. Pragmatists critics blame the "non-liberal nature" of 
the subject societies; interventionists point to the lack of capacity of the domestic political sphere; 
radicalists assign failings to external impositions on resistant indigenous ideologies (Chandler, 2017). 
Specifically, Ghani and Lockhart (2008) call for the strategic framework mentioned above to require 
a citizen-based approach as opposed to a top-down imposition by the state. State sovereignty is not 
impenetrable, and the obligation of the state to citizens and the international community is paramount 
in achieving a citizen-based framework. Mark Duffield (2007) and Oliver Richmond (2008) both 
categorize liberal peacebuilding as systems that will invariably lead to hegemonic abuse. Therefore, a 
balancing act between political-institutional support and civil society involvement is required to avoid 
power tilts. 
 
Though the conversation of peacebuilding moved beyond state building at the end of the 2000s, this 
transition must be further explored better to understand the implications of post-conflict 
reconstruction in Bosnia. Post-conflict reconstruction, through modes of peacebuilding, began to 
abandon international transformative interventions entirely, and move towards a pragmatic approach. 
The pragmatic approach bolsters the notion that the peace process must incorporate the autonomy 
and perspectives of the “local,” while forgoing the imposition of Western "blueprints" on conflict-
affected states (Chandler, 2017). "Bottom-up" approaches to peacebuilding understood the nuance of 
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the 'everyday life,' where the liberal "top-down" interventions did not account for local realities. 
Pragmatism eventually led to "resilience" in post-conflict settings; the capacity, capability, process, and 
practice of the “local” already contained the remedy for post-conflict reconstruction (Chandler, 2012). 
 
The conception of "liberal peace" by David Chandler (2017), places liberal Western values as the 
foundational criteria for post-conflict policymaking. However, there has been a loss of credibility in a 
liberal modernist approach to peacebuilding based on continuous relapses of post-conflict states back 
into conflict (Collier, 2003). Liberal peace projects the values of market-oriented policies, top-down 
reform, exclusion of local stakeholders, and pushing democratic reforms, each value ignorant to the 
root-causes of the conflicts. Reconstruction initiatives often fail to understand the local context, 
operating at higher scales of governance, and establishing a dominant model that is uniformly imposed 
on all localities. Local actors are often excluded from reconstruction processes, categorized as 
beneficiaries, as opposed to partners (Autesserre, 2014). 
 
Identifying the root causes of conflict is best obtained from the nuanced information provided by 
those who have historically endured them. Successful applications of reconciliation are best achieved 
through local consultation with the beneficiaries of peacebuilding initiatives. Local consultation 
enables a better understanding of the dynamics of past conflict, patterns of discrimination, and victim 
typologies (UN Sec Gen, 2004). Supporting the autonomy of populations affected by conflict, in 
contrast to the top-down imposition of liberal state-building, is foundational to the theories of "local 
peacebuilding" and "emancipatory peacebuilding" (Leonardson, Rudd, 2015). Local peacebuilding 
aims to incorporate perspectives of the authorities and civil-society groups operating below the state 
level to inform peacebuilding programs. In contrast, emancipatory peacebuilding actively engages the 
agency of local populations affected by the conflict to inform peacebuilding (Leonardson, Rudd, 
2015). UN peacebuilding reforms acknowledge the invaluable perspective of local communities in 
formulating the peace process through ensuring concrete engagement (UN SG A/72/707). The 
transition towards engaging local structures and citizens in post-conflict programming is relevant in 
the context of Bosnia, given the devastating pressure displacement, ethnic cleansing, and international 
structures imposed on local citizens. 
 
Understanding the progression of peacebuilding for conflict-affected states is critical when 
investigating the Bosnian context. Highlighted by Charles Call (2017), the timeline of peacebuilding 
engagements is an essential metric for gauging the efficacy of the intervention. Therefore, 
peacebuilding is conceived as a continuous process, with room for evolution through the presence of 
evaluation. Bosnia, as a post-conflict state, has witnessed the iterations of the peacebuilding 
progression. Traditional state-building prescriptions are at the core of the DPA. External actors helped 
to establish a negative peace through conventional means of democratic norms, economic 
development, military transitions, and social reconciliation. Undergirding the entire reconstruction 
process in the DPA was Annex 7, an interventionist imposition of refugee return through property 
restitution. However, before an investigation into Annex 7, the conflict driver that requires the 
solution of refugee return—ethnic cleansing—must first be understood. 
Ethnic Cleansing 
Discussed in the background, a central component of the Bosnian War was the campaign of ethnic 
cleansing. Ethnic cleansing produced tragic numbers of death and displacement and created a complex 
landscape in which the international community would craft their reconstruction interventions. The 




literature on ethnic cleansing exposes the tactics used, the rationale of the process, and remedies for 
redress. Investigating this literature helps to set a foundation on which to apply DPA's Annex 7 
implementation and achievements. 
 
Ethnic cleansing defined by James Rubenstein (2008) is one group's systematic removal of another 
ethnic, racial, or religious group from a specific territory to create ethnic homogeneity within that 
geographic unit. Unpacking the definition, Rubenstein's alludes to power imbalances, methodological 
approaches in implementation, and a boundary where the action is performed. These three 
characteristics are all evident in the context of Bosnia, as explained in the background section. Most 
importantly, the spatial component within the definition is the relationship ethnic groups have with 
"home" or space, and the subsequent displacement that is a critical product of ethnic cleansing. 
 
At its core, ethnic cleansing is a form of expulsion. The aim of expelling a particular group—ethnically 
undesirable, politically unreliable, religiously "backward"—has implications within the social, political, 
and economic spheres of society. The Confession of Augsburg principle of ethnic cleansing sought 
homogeneity as foundational to political order, thus a singular identity defines the politics that 
dominate a space (Andre Villen Bell, 1996). The horrific actions of the Nazis during the Holocaust 
introduced massacre and genocide to the practices of deportation and expulsion. The history of ethnic 
cleansing and the transitions of the instruments used to accomplish the removal manifested in the 
Bosnian War. The physical, political, economic, and social forms of ethnic cleansing worked in concert 
to achieve ethnoterritorialism. The following paragraphs will look at the concepts of ethnic cleansing 
that were propagated throughout Bosnia. 
 
Urbicide is one physical form of ethnic cleansing. Martin Coward (2009) asserts that the tactic of 
urbicide—the destruction of the built environment—aims to negate a pluralistic community and 
promote a homogenous, exclusionary political program. Urbicide, then, aligns with the 
conceptualization of ethnic cleansing. Homogeneity is conceived as, not only the displacement of an 
ethnic group, but their immutable imprint on the geography. Andras Riedlmayer (1995) defines the 
process of destroying culturally symbolic items as "killing memory." In his analysis of the Bosnian 
War, the process of urbicide not only wipes away the memory of an ethnicity's existence in a 
geography, but also the memory of coexistence that characterized Bosnia's pre-war multiculturalism 
(Riedlmayer, 1995). The destruction of the Mostar Bridge by the HVO is exemplary in the case of 
urbicide; the elimination of the bridge denotes the literal sense of urbicide, the symbolic destruction 
of memory, and again the demolition of a physical connector between two groups and two 
geographies, solidifying separation. Ensuring ethnic homogeneity means the expulsion of the ethnic 
“other," as well as the expulsion of interethnic socialization. In reference to the siege of Sarajevo, 
Nicholas Adams (1993) writes that the targeting of spaces of "collective life," museums, markets, 
libraries, and cafes, was the focus of the siege campaign. After the destruction of the Mostar Bridge, 
Slavenka Drakulic (1993) wrote an obituary of the city, highlighting the assault on the collective in this 
harrowing quote: 
 
"A dead women is one of us–but the bridge is all of us" 
 
In Bosnia, the destruction of the built environment is a procedure to rewrite the ethnic-national 
geography of Bosnia (Drakulic, 1993). Annihilation of the built environment has broad ethnic 
cleansing effects, destroying the opportunity for people to remain, destroying the memory of those 
people's existence, and destroying the presence of the community. Martin Cowards (2009) conception 
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of urbicide, enlightened by the Bosnian experience, meaningfully evokes ethnic cleansing's assault on 
connection, where the "destruction of buildings as a condition of possibility of being-with-others." 
 
Another form of the physical manifestations of ethnic cleansing is through the solidification and 
perpetuation of homogeneity by importation. After successful expulsions, ethnic cleansing campaigns 
aim to ensure the desired ethnic group populates the geography. David Gerlach coins the term 
"reliable settlers" who reshape the purged land into the desired ethnoterritorial outcome. This practice 
also manifested during World War II, where "reverse cleansing" consolidated territorial gains, ethnic 
Germans resettled in occupied territories to solidify the capture of geography (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993). 
The intention of "reliable settlers''' was not always to perpetuate the campaign of ethnic cleansing by 
the political organization. Some settlers moved for better opportunities in employment (Gerlach, 
2017). Others were coerced by the cleansing regime to relocate, either through campaigns of fear of 
the "other" or physical threat (Pickering, 2007). This action of ethnic cleansing displays how the tactic 
involves multiple displacements, one of the undesirable ethnicity, and one of the desired ethnicity, and 
how the tragedies of these campaigns are pervasive in all communities. 
 
Carrie Booth Walling (2000) bases her analysis of the topic with the claim that ethnic cleansing is 
inextricably connected to political ideals based on ethnic homogeneity, sovereignty, and national self-
determination. State power becomes the motivation to impose state-directives of ethnic cleansing. In 
the JNA, the term etnicko ciscenje was a part of the military lexicon to describe policies of expelling 
Bosniaks and Croats (Preece, 1998). Seemingly innocuous legislative and juridical processes provide 
the means for ethnic cleansing, where oppressive and discriminatory laws, lenient prosecution of the 
perpetrators, property laws and seizures, and revoking citizenship act together to displace ethnic 
populations (Walling, 2000).  
 
Once more beyond the physical, "administrative destruction," projects of bureaucracy that lead to 
expulsion, is a characteristic of non-conflict and post-conflict contexts as well (Coward, 2009). The 
bureaucratic structures of Israel, as noted by Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman (2003), implement 
restrictive urban planning mechanisms for land appropriation, occupation, settlement, and 
displacement regarding territorial conflicts with Palestine. Robert Moses' Cross Bronx Expressway 
required the movement of 1,500 families, which was commissioned through "ignoring democracy" 
(Carro, 1975). The Western planning profession is shamefully tethered to practices of displacement 
and ethnic cleansing. Political levers of urban renewal targeted minority communities and justified 
their removal (Schwab, 2018); exclusionary zoning practices reify homogeneity at the neighborhood 
level (Shertzer, et al, 2014); eminent domain mechanisms effectively steal property and force 
displacement (Solomon, et al, 2019); and lending schemes targeted minority communities to deny 
mortgage refinancing and federal underwriting upon racially defined boundaries (Rothstein, 2017). 
These examples of administrative destruction merely highlight the primacy of politics within 
campaigns of displacement, neatly aligning to the circumstance of displacement in Bosnia. 
 
Ostensibly, ethnic cleansing has different interpretations at the varying scales it is employed. The 
nationalistic political elite has an economic agenda achieved through ethnic cleansing, by consolidating 
geopolitical gains leads to economic prosperity. In Bosnia, the Yugoslavian Serb's support of ethnic 
cleansing also supported their goal of maintaining geopolitical significance. At a more granular level, 
the local political domain institutes ethnic cleansing as a means to solidify their political status. 
Patronage within the ethnic groups further solidifies their reign, and a geographic unit of ethnic 
homogeneity ensures a polity of support if represented ethnically. The local political sphere of Bosnia 
experienced these circumstances. Ethnonationalist parties engaged in political patronage to 




consolidate political control. Ethnic homogenization at the municipal and canton level in Bosnia 
homogenized the ethnic character. Through nationalistic discourse and a campaign of "otherism," the 
political elites maintained electoral dominance without a viable alternative (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993). Local 
processes of ethnic cleansing have a diversity of drivers; personal grudges, historical injustices6, and 
consumption of narratives of vilification all fuel the desire to create a boundary of ethnic homogeneity. 
Bosnia experienced all of these factors, the history of World War II evoked historical memories of 
affiliation with Axis powers, and nationalistic rhetoric of "Serb land" inspired a local push to expel 
non-Serbs. The pervasiveness of ethnic cleansing through organizational structures displays the tragic 
concepts' grip on conflict afflicted spaces; rationalizing homogeneity was exhaustive throughout 
Bosnia. However, the drive of such atrocities, like attitudes and emotions in interethnic contexts, are 
more complex than simple strategic motivations, with bigotry as the core (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993). 
 
A tragic outcome of ethnic cleansing is the displacement of the incumbent population. The experience 
of displacement deserves its own analysis, but this thesis evokes the consequence of displacement to 
understand the processes of reconciliation of forced migration. Within the DPA, refugee return 
defined the international community's goal of resolving the issue of displacement, and to that effect, 
reversing ethnic cleansing. Its relevance also manifests in peacetime, stipulated by multilateral 
agreements by safeguarding an existing territorial division (Preece, 1998). The DPA's establishment of 
two entities within Bosnia and the political decentralization of refugee return implementation 
solidified and perpetuated elements of ethnic cleansing.  
The Durable Solution of Refugee Return 
The term refugee may have become a catch-all term when describing the victims of conflict. Still, it is 
essential to understand the legalistic debates surrounding the ascription and terminology used to 
describe the victims of war. Looking at the etymology of the word, “refugee” is closely linked to 
French meanings of "hiding place," and Latin descriptions of "taking refuge" (Hornak, 2017). Inherent 
in the etymology are the themes of displacement and home. However, the complexities of sovereignty 
and citizenship have placed the terminology in a legal debate on international law and expectations.  
 
Westphalian sovereignty creates the circumstances for people's need to seek refuge; sovereign rights 
are constituted as paramount, and citizenship determines the rights and duties a person has in a state 
(Krenz, 1966). When those rights are violated or retracted, people are forced to seek the issuance of 
human rights in another country. A significant aspect of the debate on refugee terminology lies within 
this transboundary crossing when seeking asylum. With sovereignty, international obligations, and 
human rights as the criteria for determining refugee status, three distinct definitions of refugees arise 
in the international law conversation—juridical, social, and individualistic (Hathaway, 1990).  
 
The juridical conception of refugees seeks to ascribe the status of a person who becomes an 
“international anomaly” where their citizenship rights are lost within their country of origin. The social 
definition extends beyond the legalistic challenge of the "international anomaly" into an understanding 
that the safety and well-being of the refugee are paramount. The 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees is the individualist manifestation of refugee conception into law; the protections 
are limited to persons who have fled their own country and whose risk is based on political 
 
6 Among others, the massacres and ethnic cleansing tactics employed by the Utashi regime, and Axis collaborator, upon the Serb 
population in the Croatian and Bosnian areas, became rationales for Serbs to adopt nationalistic calls of territorial 
homogenization. 
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marginalization (Hathaway, 1990). The Refugee Convention gives autonomy to the signatory states in 
controlling the refugee regime system, creates non-refoulement as an international norm, and gives 
refugees socioeconomic rights and guarantees in asylum (Blake, Husain, 2003). However, a transition 
from a de facto position on group marginalization towards individual circumstance occurred at the 
behest of strong Western influences (Hathaway, 1990). The restrictionism on immigration based on 
refugee flows enters a "security discourse" that aims to understand the security dilemmas posed by 
refugee movements, including the security of the state, the security of the individual, and the 
protection of refugees (Hammerstad, 2000). The potential insecurity refugees bring to host countries, 
whether real or perceived, affect the juridical positions a state will use on the refugee crisis, manifested 
through limiting cooperation in the asylum process, violation of international law, or restrictive 
policies on refugees. These state inclinations, inspired by the security discourse, and have spurred the 
conversation of durable solutions to refugee challenges. 
 
The three durable solutions identified by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) (2007) within its core mandate include voluntary repatriation, local integration, and 
resettlement. The three solutions are born out of the politics surrounding refugees; security discourse, 
political will, and state capacity each create a unique circumstance that elucidates a viable solution for 
a refugee.  
 
According to Barry Stein (1986), voluntary repatriation is considered the "ideal, best, preferred, most 
desirable solution," though there is no consideration from whose perspective is it "ideal." While 
presented as ideal, Stein (1986) also mentions that while repatriation is sought after, UNHCR, the 
international community, and host states lack the mandate, influence, time, and resources to 
implement voluntary repatriation successfully. UNHCR (2008) goes further to assert that the return 
and reintegration process is an essential component of the reconciliation and peacebuilding process; 
supporting return is closely linked to the progressive reduction of institutional violence and promotes 
the establishment of adequate and equitable judicial systems.  
 
The most challenging aspect of voluntary repatriation is gauging the "voluntariness" of the return. In 
international law, the return process must be voluntary, safe, and dignified, yet physical and legislative 
coercion has forced repatriation upon refugees (Crisp, 2019). "Imposed return" also takes the form of 
providing financial incentives for refugees to return and the autonomy of host states to define "safety" 
(Crisp, 2016). For example, safe zones are a persistent tool of de-escalation through creating neutral 
territory free of conflict and guaranteed access to humanitarian aid, however, this mechanism can be 
co-opted to justify "safe" return, and in the case of Srebrenica7, the degree of protection may be 
woefully limited even with international presence (Landgren, 1996). 
 
Voluntary repatriation may seem like a natural return to the status quo, and perhaps evidence of a 
successful conversion to peacetime, but the tragic realities faced by refugees may preclude this desired 
outcome. The evolving relationship between refugee protection and international migration, as well 
as the social, economic, and political difficulties of post-conflict phases, propel refugees to seek 
alternatives to repatriation (UNHCR, 2007). Explained by Carmen Martin (2017), the "resolution" of 
the conflict automatically signals for repatriation, regardless of the stability of the situation.  
 
 
7 Srebrenica is a municipality in Bosnia that was designated as a “safe zone” by the UN, who would also provide protection. The 
UN failed to provide protection to civillians in the municiplaity, who were subsequently murdered by the Bosnian Serb military, 
and act of ethnic cleansing (Kroef, 2011).  




Local integration is an alternative solution to the refugee circumstance, which essentially calls for 
refugees to stay in the country providing asylum. A crude explanation of the process of local 
integration begins with obtaining permanent residence, then eventually citizenship rights. If 
the country of origin and the country of asylum are incapable of providing adequate protection and 
assistance to refugees, resettlement supports the transfer of a refugee to a third country. Industrialized 
countries play a limited role in supporting the durable solution of resettlement, supported by UNHCR 
(1984), resettlement is claimed to be the least desirable and most costly solution. In 2016, 0.31 percent 
of refugees were resettled to a third country, highlighting the limited role resettlement plays as a 
durable solution (UNHCR, 2019).  
 
In this section, the status and plight of forcibly displaced populations have focused on the legal and 
political terminology of "refugees." However, due to the debate on legal characteristics associated with 
determining refugee status, international protections, and innovative solutions neglect the experience 
of other types of forcibly displaced populations, mainly internally displaced persons (IDPs). Other 
types of migrants have been removed from the conversation; migrations due to uninhabitable 
environmental or economic conditions are not incorporated into the international protection afforded 
to those deemed "refugees" by the 1951 Convention. "Fundamentalists" aim to preserve Convention 
refugee status, and "holists" argue to broaden the interpretation of refugee-like circumstances 
(Bakewell, 2011). The debate amongst the fundamentalists and holists is crucial to continue to fight 
to protect vulnerable populations, but foundational to their arguments is the drive to support and 
remedy the causes of their displacement. The distinction between convention refugees and other 
refugee-like migrants contains relevance as it forms attitudes, policies, and resource allocation 
processes (Blakwell, 2011). However, the experience of displacement in Bosnia due to the conflict 
includes approximately 1.5 million refugees and one million IDPs (US State Department, 1996). The 
distinction between refugees and IDPs is not critical to this paper, and the two types of displaced will 
be acknowledged as Refugee or Displaced Persons (RDPs). 
 
For this paper, the debate between the conceptualization of refugees versus others is not critical; 
analyzing the durable solution to displacement through refugee repatriation is the central task and the 
experience of IDPs matter.  The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (2010) has defined three 
durable solutions for IDPs, compromised by reintegration in place of origin, local integration in areas 
where IDPs take refuge, and integration in another part of the country. The durable solution for 
refugees through repatriation and the durable solution for IDPs through reintegration both aim to 
reconcile forced displacement through return. If return is the solution, then the outcome must specify 
the procedure of return: who implements the return process, what geographical unit constitutes a 
sustainable return, and what are the social, economic, and political conditions that enable return? The 
following section details the return regime of property restitution instituted by the DPA. To frame 
this section, the DPA asserts that a reversion to a multiethnic Bosnia is a desired outcome of the 
provisions within the peace accord (DPA, 1995).  
Property Restitution8 
In the case of most forced displacements, and the case of Bosnia, conflict and ethnic cleansing have 
systematically violated the property rights of marginalized individuals. As noted in the section on 
 
8 Property restitution is the terminology used in the legal establishment of resolving the enactment of a legal wrong. In this paper, 
property restitution will also be mentioned as property repossession and domicile return. Restitution signifies the international 
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ethnic cleansing, the tools employed to achieve ethnic homogenization are myriad, and manipulating 
property is one of them. The intentional destruction of individual property, arbitrary confiscation, and 
secondary occupation are distinctive practices in violation of individual property rights (Paglione, 
2008). Building on the themes previously discussed in the literature review, property restitution is 
analyzed as a form of post-conflict reconstruction to remedy the campaign of ethnic cleansing to 
inspire the durable solution of refugee repatriation. Thus, property restitution must be understood as 
a legal mandate in international law, a useful procedural corrective for legal wrongdoing, and a viable 
and desired remedy for all aspects of displacement. 
 
With return stated as the international community's preferred durable solution, refugee return poses 
a question of what a sustainable return entails. Return requires the specific conditions of voluntariness, 
safety, and dignity, yet the international community neglects due discourse on the practical substance 
when implementing return; the decision of returning or not returning is the beginning of a complicated 
process, straining notions of feasibility and effectiveness. Traditional approaches to international law 
for refugees and the displaced are successful in ensuring rights to refugees in asylum, but are 
insufficient in providing direction for legal standards for returnees who no longer need international 
protection (Feller, 2000). Often, the source of displacement is due to the dispossession of the "home," 
thus the repatriation regime has slowly taken steps to legally incorporate property repossession within 
standards of human and refugee rights (Leckie, 2000).  
 
Three legal arenas have adopted the housing rights into their frameworks to bolster the protections 
of property in displacement—human rights law, humanitarian law, and refugee law (Leckie, 2000). 
The values of property restitution have also permeated into the mandates and declarations of 
international institutions. Property restitution regimes are buttressed by a plethora of human rights 
and legal doctrines found in multiple conventions, principles, and charters on the international 
community, including: the right to adequate housing; the right to property and the peaceful enjoyment 
of possessions; the right to be protected against forced evictions; the right to privacy and respect for 
the home; the right to freedom of movement and to choose one's residence; the rights of indigenous 
peoples; and, the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and fair balance all lend credence to 
the legal status of property restitution (Leckie, 2004). While these precedents articulate the legality of 
property restitution, other legal mechanisms have been explicit in their language on property 
repossession. 
 
Embraced by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
resolution 1998/26 on housing and property restitution for refugees and displaced persons reaffirmed 
the right of displaced people to "return to their homes and places of habitual residence in their country 
and/or place of origin, should they so wish," also pressing other UN human rights agencies to 
acknowledge property restitution considerations in their mandates (UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 1998). The Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) in their General Recommendations, underscored returnees' rights to property 
repossession and state’s obligation to support this right (UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, 1996). Other principles adopting property restitution rights include the United 
Nations Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons' Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement (1998), and the 1997 Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines on 
 
community's legal support of the practice while repossession and domicile return allude to the physical aspect of the concept and 
the social and psychological significance associated with the action. 




Development-Based Displacement (Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, 1997). As these texts 
reaffirm property restitution for the displaced, they support the normative and legal inclusion of 
property repossession within repatriation plans, peace agreements, or other 
reconstruction and return initiatives (Leckie, 2000). Injecting property restitution language within 
international legal mechanisms culminated in the establishment of the United Nations Principles on 
Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, also known as the Pinheiro 
Principles. With support from the UNHCR, the Pinheiro Principles aggregated the compelling work 
of property restitution law into a detailed set of guiding principles for standardizing property 
restitution for the displaced. The Principles developed into accumulated legislation through a 
consensus by the international community and aimed to guide practitioners, governments, and 
international agencies in property restitution endeavors (Hassine, Leckie, 2016).  
 
The inclusion of property concerns within the laws and standards for international governance of 
human rights displays the importance of property restitution as a form of reconciliation. Integrating 
property restitution within peace agreements brings assurances of successful implementation and 
sustainable peace (Leckie, 2003). The importance of expanding property restitution as an exemplar in 
return programs must pervade the institutional frameworks of the post-conflict state. It has become 
so definitive as a component of human rights in return, Anneke Smit (2012), identifies their 
interlinkage as the return-restitution nexus. According to Antoine Buyse (2008), this form of 
reconciliation is best realized when the national authorities provide the right to restitution in the 
domestic system. Yet, while property restitution is seen as indispensable for the promotion of 
reconciliation, reconstruction, and economic development within the society concerned, challenges of 
implementation persist (Leckie, 2003). In summation, the effectiveness of a norm increases when 
supported by a structure of enforcement (Diehl, et al, 2003).  
 
Challenging the property restitution regime are the potential limitations of capacity, impartiality, or 
general will to address the issue; compounding the challenge is a simultaneous reconstruction process 
of rebuilding government institutions while redressing the claims of human rights violations (Buyse, 
2008). Therefore, restitutional justice, and thereby restorative justice, is not guaranteed by the juridical 
and normative status property restitution has within the international community. The discussion then 
transitions from the legalistic relevance to the practical application. Breaking down the methodical 
steps employed to limit restitution by, in most cases, the state, prescriptions may then be crafted when 
designing the restitution program. Common obstacles to exercising the right of repossession, include 
abandonment laws, secondary occupation, discrimination, inconsistent legal and regulatory 
frameworks, arbitrary applications of the law, housing and property damage and destruction, 
destruction of ownership evidence, absence of impartial judiciaries, property contracts made under 
duress, unclear issues of title, privatization of land, unfair inheritance laws, nationality issues, lack of 
inter-agency coordination, inequitable treatment of owners and tenants, and costs of implementation 
(Leckie, 2003). In the face of these challenges, pushing the vision of reconciliation through law, equity, 
and justice via property restitution, the implementation must revert to the international community. 
 
As explained, the property restitution regime now enjoys legal validation and a nuanced understanding 
of the operational system needed to overcome potential barriers, both welcomed developments to 
support sustainable peace. Drawing on the voluntariness of refugees and IDP return, the progress of 
the legal and structural aspects of property restitution are meaningless if the displaced populations do 
not wish to return home. The decision to repatriate is multifactorial; the weight of displacement, 
horrors of conflict, and uncertainty of a stable future play a role in the willingness of repatriation. 
Balancing the conditions, a displaced person experiences in a host country versus the conditions of 
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the community of origin is part of the calculus; repatriation as an ideal solution ostensibly forgoes the 
perspectives of the displaced who successfully integrate. Return and restitution, as perceived by RDPs, 
look beyond the mere physical components of home and property towards the social community 
dynamics that created their sense of home (Smit, 2012). Inherent in the durable solution of repatriation 
is an assumption that the RDP is tethered—emotionally, financially, or spiritually—to their country 
of origin. A presumption of connection paints the RDP as inert in self-determination or personal 
change, or as defined in the "myth of return," integration within the host country outweighs the desire 
to return to the original home (Jansen, Lofving, 2007). The myth of return acts as a rejoinder against 
the proposed durable solution of repatriation; local integration and resettlement may be the best 
outcome for many RDPs.  
 
Perceptions of local integration and justice are factors in whether the nexus between restitution and 
return is viable. In contexts of ethnic cleansing, communities of origin shift in their ethnic makeup; 
local dynamics vanish, cultural items likely lost, and former neighbors gone. While domicile return is 
an avenue to "reverse" ethnic cleansing, a moral charge, the conceptualization of reversing ethnic 
cleansing rests on a return to the status quo as desirable (Toal, Dahlman, 2004). Ironically, reverting 
to the status quo merely recreates the conditions that invited the conflict. Reestablishing a connection 
to "home" in a post-conflict setting also requires institutionalizing the pursuit of justice. Reparations—
remedying the illegal act to a point where the outcome is the same as if the unlawful act never 
occurred—take the form of restitution, compensation, or satisfaction (Buyse, 2008). Restitution 
reestablishes the situation to a point before the wrongful act was committed. Settlement incorporates 
a material remedy that covers loss not remedied by restitution (Buyse, 2008). Finally, satisfaction is the 
acknowledgment by the perpetrator of wrongdoing and the assurance that the act will not reoccur 
(Shaw, 2003).  
 
Justice plays a critical role within the return-restitution nexus; the restoration of justice systems is 
direct to sustainable peace (Ellis, 2002, Intl Legal Assistance). Restorative justice, through restitution, 
creates a foundation for which the individual is remedied for the wrongdoing, reflecting a transition 
to structural forms of justice in reconstruction, and thus an enduring peace. The psychosocial aspects 
limiting return extend into tangible forms such as physical safety, economic stability, access to 
education, and access to health care (Fagen. 2011). The relationship with each of these sectors occurs 
at the local level. Thus restitution regimes cannot be decoupled from the dynamics of local civic life; 
domicile return as an effort in restitutional justice must also include the comforts of a stable life that 
accompanied an RDPs re-war life. 
 
The legal norms mentioned in the section explain the progression of post-conflict restitution rights. 
Procedural challenges of implementing programs of the return-restitution nexus elucidate the 
preeminence of institutional support, both international and domestic. Finally, the agency of the RDP 
is critical in leading the repatriation based on their perception of stability and security. Evident in the 
literature review on property restitution is that it occupies merely one tenet of a durable solution for 
refugees; a preference on a durable solution may change, and one should not be prioritized at the 
expense of another (Smit, 2012). That said, Scott Leckie (2000), a legal scholar on property restitution, 
notes that the "conditions of safe and dignified return will not and cannot be met without adequate 
safeguards designed to protect the rights of housing and property restitution of returnees." The 
following section of the thesis aims to supplement his assertion of the essential role of property 
repossession as a tool to promote refugee return given statistical analyses using empirical data on 
refugee return and property restitution and archival research of secondary resources. 





This research aims to assess the impact of the property restitution regime on the return of refugees in 
Bosnia. Given the literature, a physical return is not a quality measure in determining "success" of 
repatriation. Therefore, the aspects of justice through reverse ethnic cleansing will be analyzed among 
the programs of return and restitution. To discuss property restitution’s impact on refugee return and 
sustainable peace, the research methodology focuses on a descriptive case study to obtain knowledge 
of a phenomenon in its context (Mirriam, 1998). With the literature review as the foundation, 
integrating quantitative data, and employing secondary sources help to triangulate the theoretical 
framework with empirics.  
 
The methodology analyzes several different demographic dataset's impacts on the geography of 
Bosnia through the various domestic political boundaries. Based on the statistical and spatial analysis, 
the research describes the changes populations from pre-war to post-war, the character of the return 
movement in Bosnia, the nature of the property restitution regime, and their potentially relevant 
interactions with each other. The methodology considers three analyses:  
 
1. Quantitative 
a. Analysis of the property restitution regime’s impact on refugee return,  
b. The durability of the return-restitution on reconciliation by notions of integration, and 
2. Archival 
a. Secondary sources describing the return-restitution nexus on the ground. 
 
The analyses are further analyzed below, tables and statistical outputs complement details about the 
conceptualization of the method and its findings. Aggregating the results of each investigation will 
provide a relatively detailed understanding of the nature of the return-restitution nexus; however, 
further discussion is warranted to apply norms in the literature review to the case of Bosnia. 
Transitioning to the findings, Leckie's (2003) assertion that in many RDP repatriation operations, “the 
resolution of housing and property issues has proven to be a critical ingredient, if not a litmus test, in 
determining the success or failure of the return process within voluntary repatriation programmes," is 
essential to note as to frame the analyses. That said, critics claim "minority return became a 'numbers 
game' with its success and failure measured in terms of numbers of returnees with little regard to the 
quality of return" (Ito, 2001). The following analyses play this game, but the intention is to use local 
accounts of the conceptualization, implementation, and interaction with the Bosnian return-restitution 
regime to expose the underlying value of this peacebuilding initiative.  
Data 
The quantitative methodology uses three distinct datasets to perform the analyses. The datasets relate 
to property restitution claims, refugee returns, and population characteristics. The property restitution 
data and refugee return data are not publicly available. The demographic data is online but could not 
be downloaded in a compatible format, thus requiring its recreation. The difficulty in discovering and 
aggregating the data is representative of the disorganization of Bosnian institutions. Extending the 
claim, the lack of a centralized statistical hub for data relevant to the Bosnian War displays a reluctance 
to revisit a tragic history by the state. 
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Thanks to the support of Peter Lippman, a prominent regional and academic scholar, who shared 
PDF files of data he acquired in the past. With over 150 files shared via Dropbox, a process of sorting, 
file converting, information transferring, and data cleaning was required for each dataset to finalize a 
working format. 
 
The property restitution data came from Peter Lippman in the form of PDF files. The files represent 
the Implementation of the Property Laws in BiH managed by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), 
UNHCR, and OSCE Mission to Bosnia. The data is disaggregated by the opština level, and the 
attributes included are property restitution claims by housing type (social vs. private) and claims by 
decision (positive vs. negative). The dataset consists of restitution claims for the years 2000-2005. The 
PDFs were transferred into an excel spreadsheet to be used in Carto and Stata. 
 
Refugee return data came from Peter Lippman in the form of PDF files. The files represent UNHCR's 
statistical updates on the Summary Of Recorded Returns Of Displaced Persons Within Bosnia And Herzegovina. 
The data is disaggregated by ethnicity type and displays returns at the opština level. The data represents 
refugee return counts for the years 1998-2006. The PDFs were transferred into an excel spreadsheet 
to be used in Carto and Stata. 
 
Finally, the Bosnia census contains tabular data online representing demographics of opštinas for the 
years 1991 and 2013. The Statistical Ministry of Bosnia maintains the data. The data was transferred 
from an online browser to an excel spreadsheet. The key attributes in this dataset include were the 
population count by ethnicity. Using the population count data, insightful information regarding 
population percent change and population proportion of total were calculated to create unique 
analyses for measures of reintegration.  
 
Excel was used for cleaning and expanding the uses of the data. Carto supported SQL queries to 
analyze and interpret relationships in the data. Stata aided in the regression analyses and 
tabular/graphical outputs. 
Limitations 
The limitations of the data are abundant. The UNHCR and OHR data sets were separated by year, 
which required aggregating each separate file into one spreadsheet. The quality in reporting data on 
refugee returns and claims were inconsistent. Statistical procedures changed in data collection, which 
meant the formatting, attribute categorizations, and geography inclusion was inconsistent. The pre-
war and post-war political boundaries in Bosnia changed, but the census data accounted for the 
differences and reapplied the 1991 census to 2013 political geographies.  Also, given the dynamic 
environment in oversight and implementation, the years of the data do not entirely align, which affects 
the potential correlating significance amongst each other. It is important to note that the data is an 
abstraction of the facts on the ground, yet provides a new perspective for evaluating the reconstruction 
process in Bosnia.  
 
Relating the data collected between 1999 and 2005 with data that displays population change between 
1991 and 2013 create a flaw in the analysis. Migration and population counts within a set of years 
applied to a broader timeframe do not account for migration movements not involved, and in this 
case, deaths resulted in the Bosnina War. Yet, the analysis, in this case, return/restitution on 
sociodemographic variation, does not require a direct causal claim. The information on 




sociodemographic change is illuminating regardless of how directly the other data can be applied to 
it, thus producing a useful output. 
 
During the data cleaning process, both the refugee return data and repossession data required 
manipulating the opština fields. Inconsistent naming of municipalities, reporting of data by the 
opština, and overall exclusion required massaging the data into a useful format. The data manipulation 
was by no means significant but did change, what should be, the rigid format of the data. Most notably, 
the property restitution data did not have records for 11 opštinas. This affected the regression analysis 
as 11 records were excluded from the analysis becomes the correlation could not be used with null 
values within the independent variable.  
 
The property restitution data does not contain information regarding the decisions of returnees after 
a property claim was successful. As an avenue for restorative justice, successful claimants had the 
opportunity to sell or rent their property, and not necessarily return. With repossession and a non-
return as an option, the analysis of property restitution's impact on return is affected by this reality, as 
returnees did sell their property. However, additional survey data overcomes this limitation and is 
discussed in the third analysis. 
 
Essential to the second analysis is the notion of durability in return. Durability is based on the 
reintegration of RDPs into their origin of displacement. Still, there is a lack of attention paid to the 
timeframe of when durability is achieved (World Bank, 2015). The analysis surrounding durability and 
integration uses census data for years 1991 and 2013, but the data does not differentiate between 
displaced populations and non-displaced populations. Therefore, the population fluctuations between 
those years may not directly be a result of refugee return, but other migrations and returnees may have 
left in this timeframe, but the data would not represent this migration. Again, the resulting goal of 
reintegration extends beyond the individual and into community dynamics, and if an enduring return 
priocess, the sociodemographic data will represent it accordingly. 
 
Through the data cleaning process, much of the data needed modest manipulation to finalize a 
working format. Within the final data, a lack of information on timelines of return/restitution, counts 
of returnees, and decisions by returnees regarding restitution limit the reliability of the analyses. 
However, the data provides a substantial representation of post-conflict Bosnia that is correlated to 
the criteria analyzed. Casual relationships cannot be claimed, but when a correlation is identified, 
valuable secondary resources can be applied to explain the phenomena further. 
Analyses 
Analyzing the Impact of Property Restitution on Refugee Return 
The property restitution data highlights the information on the claim, repossession, and 
implementation process. Observing the number of claims has the potential to show the initial return 
process of filing the claim through the relevant bureaucratic mechanisms. Repossession data shows 
the extent to which the claims were viable (destruction or damage) or legal (rightful property owner). 
Put together repossessions (successful claims) by the total number of claims creates the 
“implementation ratio,” an indicator of the success rate of the bureaucratic process. Based on the 
history of ethnic cleansing, perpetuated during and after the conflict, analyzing the differences in 
  |  Sean Nelsen 
26  
 
implementation ratios can expose the willingness an opština had to the process of restitution. Figure 
7 shows little difference in the implementation ratio between entities, highlighting a relative return-
restitution regime procedure throughout Bosnia. It is important to note the difference as of 2005 is 
small, but implementation ratios prior likely differ. The uniformity is probably attributed to the 
international presence on the return-restitution regime manifested by the PLIP, as explained earlier. 
The details of this process will be described in greater detail in the findings section. 
 
Figure 7. Property Restituion Claims by Entity between 2000-2005 
 
 
The importance of evaluating the relationship between the property restitution data and the refugee 
return data in this paper is based on the deficiencies in the existing datasets. The property restitution 
data is not disaggregated by ethnicity. As mentioned earlier, the return-restitution regime is a tool in 
reconciling ethnic cleansing. To understand whether property restitution claims impacted return, the 
two data sets must be joined together to run a linear regression. A regression analysis will estimate the 
effect of the change in one variable over the shift of another (Stock and Watson, 2003). To begin the 
investigation, a simple scatter plot and line of fit graph display a linear relationship between successful 
property restitution claims by opština on the total number of returns by opština.9 
 
Figure 8. Twao-Way Scatter/Line Chart of Total Repossessions on Total Refugee Returns 
 
 
With the total returns as the dependent variable and successful repossession claims as the independent 
variable, the regression line displays a positive linear relationship, justifying a regression analysis. 
 
 
9 It is important to note that the n=130 for this regression, which differs from the total number of opštinas, which is 141. As 
explained in the section pertaining to the data, the varying reporting on the transitioning geographies made cleaning the data 
difficult. In the PLIP data set on property repossession, 11 municipalities are not accounted for in reporting property claims. 




Figure 9. Regression Output of Total Repossessions on Total Refugee Returns 
 
 
The regression analysis, shown in Figure 6, is informative for the research question posed at the 
beginning of this paper. The repossession coefficient shows that holding everything else constant, a 
one-point increase in the number of successful property restitution claims leads to a rise in returned 
refugees by 1.587 people. The positive coefficient displays a positive relationship between successful 
property restitution claims and refugee return. The amount of variance between return and restitution 
is shown at 65 percent, which is an acceptable value for r-squared. The positive relationship between 
the two variables, the relatively high r-squared value (especially given the study is based on human 
behavior), and the low p-value of the model display a statistically significant, positive relationship 
between property repossession and refugee return. Based on the available data, this quantitative 
analysis shows that there is a positive correlation between property restitution and refugee return; in 
regards to the thesis, the property restitution regime inspired refugees to return to pre-war homes. 
 
Extending this analysis, given the ethnic nature of refugee return—both in reversing or perpetuating 
ethnic cleansing in the context of Bosnia—it is essential to understand if the return-restitution regime 
had a different influence on the specific ethnicities in Bosnia. Figure 10, shown below, displays the 
linear relationships and regression analyses of property repossession on ethnic return. The line of fit 
shows that the relationship between property restitution and refugee return by ethnicity is not as 
strongly correlated as return in general.  
 
Figure 10. Two-Way Scatter/Line Chart of Total Repossessions on the Ethnic Return of Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats 
 
 
For each ethnicity, a positive linear relationship is established between return and property restitution. 
The regression out put of restituion on ehtnic return is shown in Figure 11. 
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The regression outputs for refugee return by ethnicity based on the relationship with property 
restitution each convey an increase in return by 0.72 Bosniaks, 0.20 Croats, and 0.63 Serbs with the 
one addition of a successful property restitution claim. However, the positive effect of successful 
property restitution claims is not shared equally among the ethnicities. Expressed in percentages using 
exp(coefficient), holding all else constant, for every 1 percent increase in successful property repossession 
claim a return by a Bosniak increase by 2.06 percent, a return by a Croat by 1.23 percent, and a return 
by a Serb will increase by 1.88 percent by an opština. These differences are minimal, but the analysis 
suggests the return regime manifests differently among the ethnicities of BiH.  
 
A difficult assumption to overcome is the direction of correlation. Did the imposition of property 
restitution inspire refugee return, or did the return of refugees increase property restitution claims? 
Supporting the assertion of the former causal-effect, the timeframe of refugee return and the policy 
transitions illuminate this rationale. Directly following the DPA, the return rates were the highest, with 
approximately 250,000 displaced persons returning to localities, where they were part of the 
demographic majority, termed “majority return” (Heimerl, 2005). Figure 6, in the background section, 
displays decreasing refugee return count until 1999 when the total count of returnees begins to 
increase. In 1999, the OHR instituted the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) to overcome 
local obstructionist policies to ensure minority ethnicities can return to their localities of displacement, 
termed “minority return” (OHR, 2000). Before the introduction of the PLIP, only 15 percent of 
minority claimants repossessed their property; yet, after the PLIP, the rate became above 90 percent 




(UNHCR, 2006). This information shows that property restitution did not inspire refugee return en 
toto—repatriation from abroad—but the meaningful return of displaced minorities to their opštinas 
where they were ethnically-cleansed. The claim of positive correlation-effect of property restitution 
on refugee return can be distilled down to "minority return"—the presumed durable return. 
 
The issue with this analysis is that return was not evenly shared among ethnicities within an opština. 
Because displacement was based on ethnicity, so is return. Each opština represented will have a high 
return of one ethnicity and minimal return of another. Therefore, an opština analyzed on Bosniak 
return may have a high property restitution claim count, but a low Bosniak return count, because the 
opština experienced more massive Serb displacements. Because the property restitution claims are not 
disaggregated by ethnicity, this analysis is limited in showing a relevant correlation. Yet, because the 
relationship is weak, it confirms that refugee return occurred along ethnic lines—those displaced likely 
returning home. While property restitution is evaluated as a successful mechanism for inspiring 
refugee return, the analysis performed leads to the rationale for the second question: did return edge 
to ethnic reintegration? 
Analysis of Integration10 
A defining feature of the state of Bosnia before the War was its multiethnic character (Pehar, 2019). 
A history of ethnic heterogeneity was celebrated as a quality of the country; however, it also defined 
the campaign of ethnic cleansing, aimed to erase coexistence. If a return to a multiethnic state is the 
goal of the return-restitution regime, an analysis beyond the mere implementation metric must account 
for the efficacy and durability of the process. Using the demographic data in the 1991 and 2013 
censuses, a clearer understanding of Bosnia's pre-and-post-war ethnic makeup inspires a discussion 
on whether the intended goal of reintegration was achieved.  
Measurements of Ethnic Proportionality  
Three categorizations have been developed to highlight the differences in the degree of multiethnicity 
of each opština. The first two character types are based on a degree of coexistence: a "plurality" refers 
to an opština where none of the ethnicities have a clear population majority (50 percent); a "majority-
minority" character type displays an opština that has an ethnic majority, but by no more than 80 
percent (Devine, Ortman, 2014). The character type of "homogenization" requires one ethnicity to 
have a clear majority population—above 80 percent. The 1991 population census in Bosnia displays 
a reality of multiethnic characters throughout the state and the entities. Bosnia, FBiH, and RS all 
contain a relative diversity of character types based on the aggregation of opštinas. The majority-
minority character type represented made up the most substantial portion, while plurality and 
homogenization had a balanced split among the rest of the opštinas. Figure 12 shows the count of 
opštinas by character type for each political geography. 
 
 
10 The concept of integration used in this thesis is an abstraction of the common conception. This paper uses the term 
“integration” to discuss the population proportionality of opštinis, and not the meaningful social interactions among refugees. The 
granularity of the data by opštini level does not display a nuanced spatial account of integration. The on-the-ground perspectives 
of refugees will be substituted to provide the nuanced perspective of meaningful integration. 
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Figure 12/ Opstina Count of Multiethnic Character Type by Census 
 
However, in 2013 the demographics changed within the opštinas, rewriting the character type 
distributions. Multiethnic character types of plurality and majority-minority both saw a significant 
decrease in their percent shares of the opština distribution. At the same time, opštinas, with dominant 
ethnic majorities, increased by nearly 1.5 times. Post-conflict Bosnia demographic shifts seemingly 
support the notion that ethnic cleansing during the war has left an enduring mark upon the country. 
Because data on displacement disaggregated by ethnicity is unavailable, identifying the cause of ethnic 
homogenization—directly from war tactics or other migrations—is impossible. The two entities show 
the two ethnically diverging entities shared similar transitions in character type between 1991 and 
2013, which is noteworthy in suggesting maintaining monoethnic geographies. 
 
The character type analysis succinctly demonstrates that many opštinas homogenized during and after 
the Bosnian War. Yet, a more detailed understanding of the nature of those changes will help elucidate 
a potential understanding of why they changed. The push and pull factors of ethnic cleansing—
pressuring minority displacement or majority settlement—suggest that each character type is subject 
to a blunt demographic transition. 
 
The transition from one-character type to another may provide an understanding of the way each 
opština experienced demographic change between the two census years. While the previous table 
emphasized that the homogenization of opštinas increased throughout the state, it fails to inform the 




nuances of the transition. A transition from plurality-to-homogenization tells a different story than a 
shift from majority-minority-to-homogenization. Figure 13 breaks down the changes, or lack thereof, 
between character types through 1991 and 2013. 
 
Figure 13. Opistina Count of Multiethnic Charcater Type Transitions Between 1991 and 2013 
 
 
Character types that converted after—or during—the conflict unveil a disposition towards ethnic 
consolidation. Plurality and majority-minority types both crept towards abandoning their pre-war 
multiethnic milieus towards a more singular ethnic geography. Established homogenization character 
types successfully maintained their character throughout the years, a testament to the stable supremacy 
of ethnicity in Bosnia. These tables fail in delivering a granular analysis of the opštinas, where the 
urban-rural landscapes of the locality may reify the results of the table, or provide a rejoinder against 
this curt review of demographics. The opština level is as granular as the ethnic data can get. Still, the 
opština geography cannot speak to the socioeconomic or cultural aspects of meaningful integration 
or multiethnic society. Knowledge of lived-experiences will complement the analyses provided 
through the secondary sources provided later in the paper. However, Figure 14 aims to categorize the 
multiethnic character type transitions within a language that potentially has use when analyzing the 
perspectives of locals regarding demographic changes.  
 
Figure 14. Definig Transitions in Charcter Type 
 




Core to the analysis of character types is the notion that creating and re-creating multiethnic localities 
is the desired outcome in post-conflict settings. The analysis laments a transition away from plurality, 
as it perceives a transition towards homogenization a success in ethnic cleansing and a failure of 
peacebuilding. There is a risk in assuming one-character type is a superior ethnic allocation than 
another because the data veils the circumstances that have led to the ethnic makeup of the geography. 
However, identifying opštinas that experienced a drastic demographic conversion provides better 
evidence that the militaristic and political structures that sustained ethnic cleansing may have endured. 
Figure 15 highlights such radical shifts, where the population majority in 1991 switched ethnicities in 
2013. Only ten opštinas (7 percent) witnessed the population of one ethnicity usurps the majority 
position of another between the two censuses. The Republic Srpska had 80 percent of these cases, 
and 90 percent of the cases went from majority Bosniak to majority Serb. An investigation into each 
opština and the particular history it experienced will provide more information on how these outcomes 
were achieved, however, the data aligns with the ethnoterritorial vision of reclaiming "Serb" land in 
the RS.11 
 
Figure 15. Count of Majority Changes in Ethnic Populations by Opstina 
 
Measurements of Dissimilarity  
To complement the previous analyses that defined a distancing from multiethnicity in Bosnia, the 
method of analyzing segregation proves useful. Measures of spatial segregation among the ethnicities 
in Bosnia at the opština level has the potential to bolster earlier claims of demographic change. The 
index of dissimilarity calculation, historically, is used to understand racial segregation in the United 
States (Duncan, Duncan, 1955). The index uses a statistical approach to identify the share of one 
ethnicity that would need to change areas for the evaluated groups to be evenly distributed across a 
geography. Scores in the index range from zero to one; a dissimilarity index of less than 0.3 is 
considered low, an index between 0.3 and 0.6 is considered moderate, and an index above 0.6 is 
deemed to be high (Massey, Denton, 1993). The calculation takes the distribution of one ethnicity by 
opština, where B and W are the respective frequencies of two different ethnicities in an opština, j. The 
calculation then aggregates all municipalities for an outcome that shows the percent of one ethnicity 
needed to change opštinas to reach equal occupational distributions. 
 
 
11 It is also important to note that Brcko district, a semi-autonomous region that does not operate within the FBiH or RS entity 
structures, is not incorporated in some of these tables. Brcko falls into the strength in coexistence definition as it maintained a 
plurality of ethnicities between the census years.  
 
 






The closer the score is to one, the higher the segregation is within the geographic boundary. Figure 
16 displays the dissimilarity scores for BiH using the 1991 and 2013 census. The table then shows the 
pre-war to post-war change in segregation.12 
 
Figure 16. Disssimilarity Scores among Ethnicities in Bosnia 
 
 
The calculations above show that pre-war Bosnia displayed "moderate" segregation throughout 
Bosnia, while the spatial segregation among the ethnicities in post-war Bosnia all reached "high" levels 
of dissimilarity. By aggregating the dissimilarity score by the opština level ethnic counts, each number 
displayed above shows, for an average opština, the percentage of ethnicity that needs to relocate from 
one opština to another to reach evenness.  
 
A more nuanced look at dissimilarity investigates the differences at the various geographical scales 
that have come to define Bosnia. Differences in dissimilarity scores between the two entities are not 
profound. Scores of segregation between Bosniaks and Serbs in each entity saw a modest increase 
from a low-moderate score of segregation in 1991 to a definitively moderate score of segregation in 
2013. As the entities of FBiH and RS are representative of the ethnic division in Bosnia, it is surprising 
that the change in scores within the entities are not more drastic. Segregation between Croats and the 
other entities remained high between the two census periods in both entities. However, in RS the 
dissimilarity score had a slight decrease; the decline is not indicative of any form of spatial "integration" 
and is likely produced by disparities in population decreases. Figure 17 provides the dissimilarity scores 
among ethnicities by year and entitiy. 
 
Figure 17. Dissimilarity Score of Ethnicities by Entity for Years 1991 and 2013 
 
 
Figure 18 dives further into the dissimilarity scores of the cantons and municipalities of FBiH and RS, 
respectively. As expected, most of the dissimilarity scores between Bosniaks and Serbs increased 
 
12 Segregation, like integration, is used in this paper to describe the changing demographic landscape within Bosnian 
geographies. It specifically uses the available census data to describe ethnic proportionality in the various governmental 
boundaries, with the Canton being the most granular. 
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throughout the canton/municipalities. Central Bosnia is a notable exception to this trend, where the 
spatial segregation decreased within the canton between Bosniaks and Serbs. Unearthing an 
explanation for this unusual change requires understanding the local dynamics of the municipalities 
within the canton.  
 
Figure 18. Dissimilarity Score of Ethnicities by Canton for Years 1991 and 2013 
 
 
While the percent changes in the cantons tell a story of increased segregation, looking at the scores in 
detail tells a different story. While many cantons saw increases in dissimilarity, the majority of cantons 
sustained a moderate score of dissimilarity. For each dissimilarity score by ethnicities, 29 percent of 
cantons sustained a low score of dissimilarity, which is slightly higher than the average amount of 
cantons with a high segregation score (25 percent). Figure 19 breaks down the count of cantons by 
segregation index within the entities of Bosnia. One inference about the general increases in the 
dissimilarity of the cantons, while maintaining low and moderate segregation scores on average, is that 
the disruptions of integration are occurring at the more granular municipal level. Accounting for the 
increase in homogenized municipalities based on the population proportionality changes (the previous 
analysis), the demographic shifts are more severe at the municipal level. Yet, the migrations rarely 
extend beyond the canton boundary. Aligning these two understandings of the ethnic makeup of 
municipality and canton levels show the importance of local dynamics as a factor in refugee return 
and post-conflict reconciliation. 
 








Using the dissimilarity index as a proxy for integration/segregation, the impact of the return-
restitution regime can be analyzed against the outcome of integration. Higher refugee returns 
ostensibly indicate a political willingness towards reconstruction. This political flexibility would then 
translate into a disposition towards justice and reintegration. Curtly put, higher returns and higher 
property restitution rates translate into pre-war levels of dissimilarity.  
 
Figure 20 shows the line of fit when correlating total refugee return with the percent change of 
dissimilarity index between Bosniaks and Serbs. The fit is weak, yet the positive linear relationship 
indicates that with more returns, the segregation of a canton increase. Returns of one ethnicity impact 
the population total of another ethnicity, which is supported by the findings in the regression analysis 
that showed the positive relationship between a minority return with the population increase of a 
different minority in the first analysis. Now we have two regressions that correlate increased refugee 
returns on ethnic homogenization of differing ethnicities. 
 
Figure 20. Regression of Total Refugee Returns on Dissimilarity Score Between Bosnian and Serbs 
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Using the disaggregated return data by ethnicity, the specific dynamic of ethnic returns can be applied 
to the dissimilarity between those ethnicities. The regression lines in Figure 21 show a diverging 
narrative; higher instances of Bosniak returns leads to a decrease in segregation, while higher return 
rates of Serbs increase segregation. This outcome is interesting because it essentially says that Serb-
majority opštinas become less segregated. However, given the high amount of returning Bosniaks due 
to their increased proportion of displacement, the demographic shifts in Serb-majority opštinas are 
more significant, thus impacting the segregation metric.  Though the low r-squared value and 
insignificant correlation coefficient provide a weak case for refugee return's impact on dissimilarity, 
the contrasting relationships offer insight. Given the higher amount of returns by Bosniaks than Serbs, 
higher population changes alter the proportionality of Bosniaks in returned opštinas, leading to lower 
percent changes in dissimilarity scores. The regression below solidifies the diverging impact of returns 
and sociodemographic reintegration by ethnicity. 
 
Figure 21. Two-Way Scatter/Line Chart of Bosniak/Serb Return on their Respective Dissimilarity Score Percent Change 
 
 
Review of Quantitative Analyses 
 
In the first analysis, measuring successful property restitution claims on refugee return provided a 
statistically significant result that there is a positive relationship between property repossession and 
refugee return. A strong positive correlation between the two variables signifies that the property 
restitution regime in Bosnia had an impact on inspiring refugee return. The high percentages of the 
implementation of property claims also supports the efficacy of the property restitution program. The 
correlation between property restitution and returns by ethnicity showed a slightly weaker positive 
relationship but reinforces the type of minority return inherit in the property restitution regime.  
 
As refugee return is touted as a durable solution to maintain post-conflict peace, through the 
opportunities of reintegration refugee return provides, an analysis of its "durability" in the context of 
Bosnia is a necessary inquiry. The analyses of proportionality and dissimilarity both provide a metric 
for the DPA's goal to recreate the multiethnic Bosnia that existed before the war. Based on the 1991 
census data, Bosnia existed as a multiethnic society, even when evaluated at the opština level. However, 
the multiethnic character of the opštinas decreases according to the 2013 census—through population 
distribution and index of dissimilarity. The evenness of ethnic population distribution at each scale of 
governance also reduces. The statistic measuring segregation—the dissimilarity index—supports to 
population distribution decreases, further supporting increases in segregation throughout Bosnia. 




Finally, a weak positive correlation between refugee return and increased segregation highlights that 
the return regime was unsuccessful in reintegration or notions of "durability." 
 
However, does the data support the reality of the return-restitution regime in Bosnia? The abstractions 
provided by the data sets a critical foundation for which to evaluate the local experiences of return, 
repossession, and reintegration. 
Archival Research and Secondary Sources 
The DPA's Annex 7 established how the property restitution regime would be implemented in post-
conflict Bosnia. From the text, displaced populations have the "right to freely return to their homes 
of origin" and "have the right to have restored to them the property of which they were deprived in 
the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored 
to them" (DPA, 1995). The language of the DPA satisfies many of the common barriers to return 
highlighted by Leckie in the literature review. Not all aspects of restitution deterrence are stated 
explicitly in the DPA; however, Annex 7 established the Commission for Displaced Persons and 
Refugees (CRPC), which acts as an independent body to ensure the efficacy of the return-restitution 
regime. In this political body, the specific processes to overcome traditional barriers to return were 
conceptualized. Bolstering Annex 7, the Bosnian Constitution adopted the principles of return rights 
as a provision, giving more legal teeth to the restitution-regime nexus. The table below highlights 
which common barriers to return were explicitly addressed by the language of DPA's Annex 7. More 
than half of the barriers highlighted by Leckie are directly addressed in the DPA, ostensibly grounding 
the processes of property restitution in a compelling legal format. The document, therefore, 
establishes property restitution as a direct criterion in enacting peace in Bosnia. However, the language 
in the peace accord does not necessarily translate into efficient and effective implementation. 
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Figure 22. Leckie’s Common Barriers to Restitution Addressed by the DPA 
 
 
The DPA was the first iteration of international governance that would provide oversight to the 
structures of post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia. Regarding property restitution and return, the 




Commission, which changed its name to the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced 
Persons and Refugees (CRPC), whose mandate was explained in Annex 7: 
 
the mandate of the CRPC is broadly expressed and provides that the Commission shall receive and decide any claims for real property 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the property has not voluntarily been sold or otherwise transferred since April 1, 1992, and where 
the claimant does not now enjoy possession of that property. Claims may be for the return of the property or for just compensation in 
lieu of return (DPA, 1995). 
 
The mandate also gave the CRPC legal powers to ensure decisions confirm the property rights or 
other legitimate interests of the RDPs seeking restitution. The structure of the institution also needed 
to be defined, taking ten months to determine a claims procedure, draft rules for decision-making, 
obtain a state of property records, and alert displaced persons who were entitled to claim (Garlick, 
2000). After creating the claims process, instituting claims decisions became a problem beyond the 
capacity of the CRPC. The CRPC was not given the mandate to implement its own decisions. Annex 
7 enlisted domestic legal bodies for the implementation role of claims. The language of the DPA 
required that "Parties shall cooperate with the work of the Commission, and shall respect and 
implement its decisions expeditiously and in good faith" (DPA, 1995). The vague legal language shall 
gave the autonomy of respecting claims decisions to the same political elites that benefited from the 
displacement during the conflict—a true display of ethnic discrimination.  
 
The domestic structures within the two entities both delayed or actively opposed the return-restitution 
nexus regime mandated by the CRPC. Lynne Hastings (2001) described the implementation of the 
CRPC claims as "ad hoc and disunified," between the two entities. Much of the reluctance to support 
the claims issuance came from the political authorities; misinformation on processing, illegal 
processing fees, refusal of claims, and denying concerted political bodies to handle claims are among 
the state-imposed barriers to restitution. However, the biggest obstacle to implementing processed 
claims by the CRPC came through anti-eviction tactics (Garlick, 2000). Even at the grassroots level, 
local populations expressed solidarity with the secondary occupants, and ethnically defined police 
forces refused to carry out evictions. One month before the deadline on the CRPC's mandate, less 
than 50 percent of eligible claims for restitution for the socially-owned property had been filed 
(Hastings, 2001). Even in situations where the least amount of burden to reintegration existed—
socially-owned property—authorities still obstructed the claims. By 2000, the CRPC had not returned 
all or even most of the over two million originally displaced people to their pre-war homes in Bosnia 
(Garlick, 2000).  
 
If the CRPC was ineffective given the limited capacity to implement decisions and the obstruction of 
local authorities, how does the quantitative analysis showing the efficacy of the property restitution 
regime align with the lived experience of the program? 
 
In 1999, the UNHCR, OSCE, OHR, and the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH) adopted the Property Legislation Implementation Plan (PLIP) and imposed its mandate 
in Bosnia. The essential elements of the PLIP included: reforms of the property legislation; 
decentralized Property Commissions throughout the country; consequences for individuals and 
authorities obstructing return; capacity and resources for housing authorities; and an information 
campaign targeting current occupants (PLIP, 1999). The PLIP successfully addressed the deficiencies 
within the conception and implementation by the CRPC. Meaningful coordination within the 
international community and among local authorities helped to consolidate the process and impose 
the impartial administration of the international community. Prosecution of officials who hampered 
the return-restitution process—22 officials removed from their municipal offices in 2000—allowed 
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for the implementation of repossessions to begin (OHR, 1999). Increased capacity and resources 
enabled authorities to process the high volume of claims efficiently and suitably (Hastings, 2000). The 
PLIP was instrumental in defeating the stagnation of the repossession process. Aligning with the 
literature, the international imposition of norms in property restitution created the conditions for 
refugee return and reconciliation through compensation; the long-term and exhaustive engagement 
by the international community in the process of restitution is a testament to the need for long-term 
commitments.  
 
The imposition of the international community triumphed internal barriers to return. However, the 
necessity of the return-restitution nexus is framed within the logic of the international community, 
and the domestic perspective is wanting. The hope to overcome "backward ethnopolitics" and to 
correct the injustices of war may be sympathies of the neocolonial regime (Pehar, 2019). The domestic 
sphere mirrored the different perspectives on the return-restitution regime; the political elites of 
Bosnia and RS expressed differing views on the success of refugee return in Bosnia. In 2008, the 
Bosnian President, Haris Silajdzic expressed that ethnic cleansing endured, that Annex 7 has not been 
completely implemented, and the ethnocracy established in the competing entities renders effective 
democratic governance impossible (Silajdzic, 2008). In the same year, Milorad Dodik, President of RS, 
stated that there was no ethnic cleansing in RS, and the organization of Bosnia's geography along 
ethnic lines is the most suitable outcome for the state (Bosnia Daily, 2008). The divergence in the data 
also complements these diverging views on the return-restitution process. The data shows that 
property restitution was successful in leading to return, but return itself was not successful in recreating 
multiethnicity. Therefore, there is an inherent paradox in observing the success of Annex 7 on the 
lasting impacts of ethnic cleansing. 
 
The account of the structural mechanisms and institutional transitions within the property restitution 
regime that supported successes in the repossession claims processing and implementation 
complements the findings of a high implementation ratio based on the property restitution data. The 
moral and legal drive for successful return-restitution fueled the international community's long-term 
and authoritative role in implementation. The domestic sphere of influence is split in pursuing Annex 
7; Siladjdzic and other local leaders saw population return as a precursor to achieving justice and a 
return to multiculturalism in Bosnia. While Dodik and others found the goal of return unwarranted, 
some in the international community also found minority return a mistaken priority that diverted 
funding from other meaningful post-conflict reconciliation projects, let alone the aspirations of all 
displaced persons (Toal, Dahlman, 2011). However, if the right to return to one's pre-war property 
remains one of the most significant human rights issues in Bosnia, as stated in the DPA, then local 
perspectives on the process of return and restitution need to be enlisted to respond to the findings 
from the quantitative analysis. 
 
In 2004, an understanding of the potential divide between successful restitution and sustainable return 
was underscored by the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, welcoming the 
success and effort in property repossession, but "priority attention should now be devoted to ensuring 
the sustainability of returns." The sustainability of returns requires an accommodating locality for an 
RDP to ensure long-term socioeconomic opportunities. Often, these opportunities are wanting in 
areas of return, and often repossession does not mean return. The legal right of restitution instilled by 
the DPA did not enforce a physical return upon a successful claim; after repossession of property, 
claimants do not necessarily equal a return to the locality to reinstate pre-war life. Property has been 
kept empty, used intermittently, exchanged, or sold by an owner; in 2004, it was estimated that only 




20-30 percent of repossession resulted in physical returns (European Commission Against Racism 
and Intolerance, 2004). A resident predicted this reality in the RS: 
 
"It is better live elsewhere in worse conditions than to be in a place where you are insecure...All public policies are designed to create 
fear for minorities” (Pickering, 2007).  
 
Much of the historical accounts of returnees display a reluctance to return home, either through 
internal or external impediments. Connecting the perspective of the international monitoring 
organization and the individual sentiment above by the ethnic minority, there existed a dissonance 
between restitution and return. Restitution satisfied a critical legal right, human right, and moral justice 
in the face of ethnic cleansing, but it is an "unreliable as an instrument for facilitating return" (Williams, 
2006). Given restitution was the preferred avenue for inspiring return, the only option to recreate a 
pre-war sense of home is through the development of a positive relationship between housing and 
the surrounding local and national environment. The different ethnicities may not have shared the 
decision to return and reintegrate.   
 
A nationally representative survey conducted in 2005 inquired at the decisions of property restitution 
claimants throughout the country. The survey is disaggregated by ethnicity and entity and enlightens 
the experiences of post-repossession. With 2,000 respondents, the question of "What happened when 
you reclaimed your house?" provides a statistically significant subsample to analyze (Toal, Dhalman, 
2011). The contrast in decisions by ethnicity and entity is significant; majorities of Bosniaks and Croats 
(75.9 percent and 86.9 percent, respectively) returned after repossession while less than a third of 
Serbs returned, and an equal proportion of Serbs sold their home. This information supports the data 
on ethnic majority transitions in Bosnia (90 percent switched from Bosniak to Serb), given the 
preference of Serbs to integrate into locations of displacement over the act of returning, as highlighted 
by the survey. Analyzing the responses by entities show that overwhelming (72.2 percent) respondents 
displaced in FBiH returned to their property. In contrast, nearly a third of respondents from RS sold 
their homes and likely locally integrated (Toal, Dahlman, 2011). Again, the changes in dissimilarity 
between 1991 and 2013 support the survey results; Serb to Bosniak/Croat segregation indices 
increased in RS, while Bosniak to Croat dissimilarity decreased. The survey results can also explain 
why a higher percentage of FBiH opština's homogenized in 2013; Bosniaks are more willing to return 
to opštinas where they are the minority while Serbs are more likely to integrate in a Serb majority 
locality.  
 
The Helsinki Committee, a group of international human rights lawyers, described the "socio-
demographic structure of BiH society" as the resounding metric to assess the success of post-conflict 
reconstruction, yet failed to support their assertion as "Bosnia does not have credible statistical 
information" (Helsinki Committee, 2010). Based on the data aggregated in this paper, the restitution 
regime displayed evidence of successful implementation; however, the results of refugee return and 
"reverse ethnic cleansing" are more difficult to discern. The homogenizing localities, increases in 
dissimilarity throughout the state, dubious relationships among return/restitution and demographics, 
and differences in the lived experiences of refugees, are all useful in demonstrating that the restitution 
regime and the return regime must be separated when evaluating post-conflict reconstruction. The 
practical, political, and legal triumph of creating a successful property restitution program is an 
incredible accomplishment; despite the feat, evaluating its success as a contributor to sustainable peace 
and the durable solution of refugee repatriation is no longer appropriate.  
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Foundational to the limitations of the DPA as an efficacious purveyor of post-conflict reintegration 
was the reliance Dayton had on traditional state-making perspectives for post-conflict reconstruction. 
Within the literature, the transition towards grassroots peacebuilding as an eeffective form of 
reconciliation had limited recognition in the Bosnian context. According to Drazen Pehar (2019), the 
failures of the DPA are attributed to how the "colonizers got carried away in their business of state-
making." The international imposition of state-making, crafting the governance structures that were 
to overcome political divisions in Bosnia, disregarded the role of local communities (Pehar, 2019). 
Therefore, the bottom-up approach to defining the durability of a post-conflict reconciliation program 
needed the perspective of the returnees and locals. RDPs see unemployment and corrupt political elite 
as obstacles for improving their situation in their locations of return. Many feel that the neglect of 
state responsibility for creating viable conditions of security and employment in the areas of return 
(Babic, 2013). 
On the other hand, local perspectives on returning refugees highlight the potential dependency they 
have on aid or their unwillingness to pursue employment (Babic, 2013). The divergence between these 
two perspectives is that one suggests that the political power structures impede meaningful 
reintegration, while the other claims that the issue is based on personal agency. Because they diverge, 
accomodating the perspectives of the displaced and incumbent population is necessary to foster 
sustainable interventions of reintegration. Further complicating the process of reintegration is the 
economic condition of the post-socialist locality, urban-rural division in economic success, the 
experience of interethnic violence, the experience of war, and personal experience that reorients a 
familiarity with "home."   
 
Elucidating localized and nuanced perspectives from secondary sources and archival research, 
provides an invaluable complement to the quantitative analysis portion of the methods, especially 
given the limitations of the data. Together, the analysis exposes where the connections are strong 
among the relationships of restitution, return, and demographic character in Bosnia. The processes 
surrounding post-conflict reconstruction explain specific interactions between the data, while the data 
supports certain outcomes described by the outcomes highlighted through the secondary sources. 
Conclusion 
The Dayton Peace Accords successfully ended the Bosnian War while simultaneously instituting a 
post-conflict reconstruction plan that embodied progressive international values of human rights, 
refugee rights, and peacebuilding. Annex 7 defines the DPA's core mandate in reconciliation and 
justice through the aim to reverse ethnic cleansing and reestablish a multiethnic state. However, 
compromise in the DPA plagued the durability of the post-conflict vision. Inherent to the agreement 
was the "political institutionalization of the ethnic partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina that was 
established by war rather than its reintegration" (Burg, 1997). Promoting ethnic reintegration at the 
local level while concurrently lacking coordination to expel the ethnonationalist political elite that 
pervaded all scale of governance established a paradoxical goal—crafting processes to reverse ethnica 
cleansing that would subsequently be handled by institutions that desired ethnic homogenization. 
Further confounding the process, the other paradox of legally mandating the physical repossession of 
lost property disregards the complex, psychosocial elements of reintegration—a physical cure for a 
disorder that extends beyond the physical. Yet, property restitution undergirds the post-conflict 
reconstruction landscape of Bosnia. 
 




The program of property restitution in Bosnia is a definitive success when looking at the rate of 
implementation and the bureaucratic hurdles that were resolved. But, the local dynamics of home, the 
socioeconomic factors of stability, and the community dynamics resultant of demographic change are 
each removed from a crude physical representation. The statistics show that property restitution had 
a minimal impact on refugee return. Given the drastic demographic shifts, it was limited in returning 
Bosnia to a truly multiethnic state, let alone refugees to their homes. Moving forward, property 
restitution must not dominate the reconstruction landscape but compliment the variety of 
peacebuilding activities that go beyond personal restorative justice. 
 
If "home" is conceptualized as a return to "normal life" through assurances of stability, security, and 
community, the post-conflict context is likely not to support that goal. If a sense of "home" is 
disrupted during and after the war, the discussion on refugee return should not rely on a simple 
nostalgia of returning to pre-war life. In many cases, and especially in Bosnia, post-conflict 
reconstruction aims to upend the political, economic, and social structures of society to something 
more progressive. But given their interdependence, the complexity of this task is all but impossible. 
In the case of Bosnia, the return to "home" was deficient in returning stability stolen by displacement, 
but aligned more to a return to physical space. Therefore, the return-restitution regime of Bosnia must 
be reframed as a procedure for economic security over a return to a memory. In this 
reconceptualization, the disconnect between successful property restitution and a successful 
demographic reengineering to pre-war levels is not as disconcerting. The property restitution regime 
becomes a tool of justice without adding the complexity of reversing ethnic cleansing—individual 
stability outweighs assumptions on proper post-conflict community dynamics. So, is post-conflict 
reconciliation an emphasis on personal redress or community development? 
 
Because property restitution inspired refugee return, but refugee return did not lead to meaningful 
reintegration of RDPs, the pure material repossession of property is an ineffective tool for post-
conflict reconciliation in Bosnia. Given the high implementation ratio, property restitution was a 
successful form of justice for individuals who experienced expulsion from their homes. Yet, the 
reconciliation through justice did not extend beyond the individual into the community. Minority 
returnees did not find a return to normal life; political, economic, and social exclusion precluded 
successful reintegration into a functioning multiethnic society. Modifying the return-restitution regime 
to provide individual justice with community justice must be a goal within the international 
community's prescription of the refugee return regime. The lack of economic opportunities for many 
returnees is listed as a primary contributor to unsuccessful returns; either employment was not 
available upon return, or return was not rational because of the substantial employment opportunities 
in locations of displacement (Toal, Dhalman, 2011). This economic inhibitor still exists; as of 2014, 
Bosnia had the highest youth unemployment rate at 57.5 percent. Injecting the migration-development 
nexus into the return-restitution nexus is a critical step in acknowledging the deficiencies of the 
Bosnian context. 
 
The migration-development nexus asserts that migrants are agents of development, and therefore 
migration can produce beneficial outcomes (Faist, 2007). In the context of Bosnia, refugee return has 
the potential to be leveraged as a tool for economic and political development. Political and economic 
development is fraught in post-conflict settings, given the need for returnees to navigate new contexts 
of power and inequality under emerging social transformation processes (Ranger, 1994). In Bosnia, 
returnees must negotiate their position in demographically reengineered space and consolidate 
ethnonational political structures. Overcoming the reality of an ethnically reengineered Bosnia, a 
sustainable peace through reintegration is not a product of the return-restitution regime. The 
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mechanism for matching returnees to stolen property must be complemented with the meaningful 
process of ensuring social, political, and economic transformations. When the return-restitution 
regime is coupled with the migration-development nexus, economic vitality has the potential to inspire 
social transformations and a change in power structures. Only when stability for all is available, then 
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